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The University of Chicago War Papers

No. 1

THE THREAT OF GERMAN WORLD-POLITICS

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

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Published January 1918
Second Impression February 1918

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

THE BAKER & TAYLOR COMPANY
NEW YORK

THE J. K. GILL COMPANY
PORTLAND, OREGON

THE CUNNINGHAM, CURTISS & WELCH COMPANY
LOS ANGELES

THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON AND EDINBURGH

THE MARUZEN-KABUSHIKI-KAISHA
TOEYO, OSAKA, KYOTO, FUKUOKA, SENDAI

THE MISSION BOOK COMPANY
SHANGHAI

THE THREAT OF GERMAN WORLD-POLITICS

THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE WAR ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES

The United States has been driven into war with Germany by the entry of that power into a policy of piracy on the high seas. Within the area of the Atlantic Ocean, some fifteen hundred miles long and six hundred miles wide, and within nearly all of the Mediterranean Sea notification has been duly given that vessels will be sunk by German submarines without regard to nationality and without regard to the purpose of their voyage.

The joint resolution adopted by Congress in April, 1917, declared a state of war to exist with Germany. Eighteen American ships had already been sunk by German attacks, and two hundred thirty-seven Americans had been killed. The attacks were not only on vessels of the United States. Piratical raids were uniformly aimed at everybody. One-third of the Norwegian commercial marine had been destroyed. In May, 1915, the "Lusitania," a passenger ship, was sunk without warning, without giving any chance for the safety of those on board. More than one thousand persons were drowned. Over one hundred of these were Americans, many of them women and little children.

In these German attacks on neutral rights and safety there was no remote resemblance to the acts of the British navy. While it is true that American commerce with Germany was hindered and in a large measure prevented by the British naval blockade, at the same time not one American life had been lost, not one American ship had been destroyed. It was wholly a matter of property. Each claim on the British government resulting from the blockade could be settled by courts of law, and damages could be paid in money. The only immediate effect on American prosperity was perhaps that the profits of American business might be double rather than threefold what they had been before the war. Further, the question as to the unlawfulness of the British blockade at best was in doubt. Very likely a suit before a court of arbitration on that ground would have gone against the United States.

A government which does not protect the rights of its citizens on the high seas will presently have no rights left. If we permit Germany to

forbid navigation within twenty miles of the coast of Spain, presently we may expect to have that navigation forbidden twenty miles from the coast of the United States.

In short, a government which peaceably submits to such outrages will have and will deserve to have the contempt of the world.

The lawless acts of the German navy under the specific orders of the German imperial government constituted war upon the United States. The joint resolution of Congress in April did not begin war, but recognized a state of war as already existing by the act of Germany.¹

THE DEEPER CAUSES OF THE WORLD-WAR

We now realize clearly that the world-war, however, has much deeper causes than the mere attempt to blockade the Entente Allies by a submarine campaign. This deeper cause in its essence is a world-wide piratical attack by Germany on nations which have what Germany wants. The word "piracy" is here used in a larger sense than its technical application in international and criminal law. In this larger sense it means seizing by force what belongs to another nation, whether by land or sea. We have learned that there is a scheme, the result of decades of careful and elaborate planning, for subjecting the entire world, sooner or later, to the domination of the German Empire. There is a scheme for seizing coveted lands and coveted dominion in every quarter of the globe. It is in this conflict for the liberty of the world that our country is now deeply concerned. Should the submarine policy itself be withdrawn, it would be idle for us to put a stop to hostilities. We must stay in the fight until these deeper causes of the Great War are destroyed, and until there are adequate securities against their early recurrence.

In reality, then, this war on the part of the United States is, in the first place, a war of self-defense and, in the second place, a war for the defense of all the other democracies of the world.

THE GERMAN EMPIRE AN ENEMY OF THE WORLD

The German Empire as now organized and as now administered is an enemy of the world by reason, first, of its controlling forces; by reason, secondly, of the far-reaching, piratical aims of those forces; by reason, thirdly, of the methods by which the imperial government of Germany seeks to attain these ends.

¹ "War Information Series": *How the War Came to America*, pp. 22-23.

I. THE CONTROLLING FORCES IN GERMANY

The controlling forces in question are perhaps five:

1. The first is the virtually autocratic government of the empire.

The constitution of the German Empire is such that the will of the king of Prussia finds easy expression and is only with great difficulty to be resisted. While nominally a constitutional monarch, virtually he is an autocrat.

In these days monarchy is by no means always equivalent to autocracy. In the British monarchy, for instance, it is true that the king succeeds by heredity in the limits of a certain family. However, this succession was determined by act of Parliament, and act of Parliament may set aside the royal family altogether, or any king within the royal family. The British ministers and the Cabinet in England are responsible, not to the king, but to the elective House of Commons. In other words, Parliament through a freely elected House of Commons actually governs the country. The king reigns, but he does not rule. The House of Commons is chosen by what we may call universal suffrage, and in itself has the power under certain customary conditions, not merely to enact new legislation, but even to change the fundamental laws of the country. In short, the British monarchy is a real representative democracy. It is a monarchy only in name.

In Prussia the monarchy is quite different. Here the king also succeeds by heredity and in a certain family, but that succession is independent of parliament or constitution. It is claimed by the king that he succeeds by divine right and not by the will of the people. The Prussian constitution was not made by the Prussian people. It is a grant from the king, who may at any time revoke it. The Prussian ministry is responsible, not to the Prussian parliament, but to the king, who appoints and removes his ministers without regard to parliament or to the popular will. The upper house of the Prussian legislature consists of members who succeed by heredity, and of others appointed by the king. The lower house of the Prussian parliament is, to be sure, elective, but elective by the people on the three-class system. The electorate is divided into three classes according to the amount of taxes paid. The first class, electing one-third of the members, contains approximately 4 per cent of the population. The second class, electing another third of the members, contains about 14 per cent of the population. The third class, also electing one-third of the members, contains about 82 per cent of the population.

In other words, in the Prussian government the king, the hereditary nobility, and the possessors of wealth govern the country. The masses are very nearly helpless.

In the German Empire the king of Prussia, by virtue of being king of Prussia, is German emperor. The ministers are responsible to the emperor, not to the parliament, the chancellor and other members of the ministry being appointed and removed without regard to the desire of parliament or to the popular will excepting in so far as the emperor sees fit. The upper house of the parliament, the Council of the Empire, consists of the delegates appointed by the governments of the 25 states in the federal empire. In this body of 61 delegates there are 17 Prussians; that is, they are virtually appointed by the king of Prussia; and 3 others whom the German emperor, that is, the king of Prussia, controls. These delegates must vote as directed by those who appoint them. Further, no change in the fundamental law of the empire can be made against the votes of 14 members of the Council. Thus the king of Prussia, or in other words the emperor, can prevent any constitutional amendment.

The lower house of parliament—the Reichstag—is elected by universal suffrage, the electors being not less than twenty-five years of age. However, the original apportionment was made in 1871 and there has been no change since. A deputy from Berlin represents on an average about 125,000 voters, while a deputy from the districts of East Prussia, which contain the Prussian landed aristocracy, represents only about 24,000 voters. Legislation is virtually determined by the Council of the Empire, and the Council of the Empire is controlled by the emperor and by the other hereditary princes.

The German Empire is far from being a democracy, whether direct or representative. The power to declare war is in the emperor with the assent of the Council, but when the emperor sees fit to consider the war a defensive one he may declare war without the consent of the Council. That is just what happened in 1914, when the Emperor declared war—and thus is wholly responsible for bringing on the great world-war in which we are now engaged.

2. Another of the controlling forces is the Prussian military caste, arrogant, exclusive, and determined on domination.

The Prussian nobility, at least by custom, has so managed affairs that it has a practical monopoly of appointments to office in the army. In the reserve, sons of great commercial magnates are allowed minor positions, but the control of the army is for the nobles. Their power in politics, especially in eastern Prussia, owing to semi-feudal conditions

and to archaic election laws, is very great. Thus a mediaeval noble class, military and political in power, depending on the emperor for its prestige and in turn supporting the emperor as a God-given monarch, is one of the controlling forces in the German Empire, and a force sinister and baleful in the extreme. The members of this class believe implicitly in the divine right of the noble to flout the common man and of Prussianized Germany to flout the world. Arrogant, insolent, domineering, they go far to make and to keep Germany a bitter enemy to free democratic institutions through all the world.

3. Still another of the controlling forces is found in those who direct the manufacturing and commercial life of the German Empire. They are determined to spread their enterprises throughout the world, not merely by ordinary competition, but by force wherever competition in itself is not sufficient. Years ago it was said repeatedly to a thoughtful American at that time visiting in Germany that Germany must shortly have a war with the United States, the reason being that the United States had begun to attempt to secure a share in the world-markets. This attempt, it was said, must be met with cannon, because those markets belonged to Germany.

4. The fourth great controlling force is the Pan-German organizations. These organizations have been actively at work in definite form since about 1894. Their aims cover the world, and have been expressed in a series of pamphlets, articles, and books with which Germany in the last two or three decades has been flooded. While ostensibly private organizations, it is very clear that their aims are essentially the aims of the other controlling forces in the Empire, and must be reckoned with by the rest of the world, therefore, not as the mere vaporings of irresponsible individuals, but as the deliberate plan which Germany as a whole is determined on carrying out.¹

5. Another of the ruling influences in Germany is a strange philosophy of the state which seems generally accepted. There is no law of right but that of power, if the state is a party. In short, ethics, as commonly understood in the rest of the world, in Germany apparently applies, if at all, only as between individuals. The state is not bound by any standard but its own advantage. Laws, treaties, solemn governmental engagements, cease to be binding as soon as they cease to be advantageous. Chivalry, courtesy, humanity, are of no account at all if the state otherwise orders. To be sure, this is a code of ethics which is appropriate for pirates; but it is a code which is unquestionably

¹ Chéradame, chap. i.

German today. It differs from the ethical code of the German barbarians who overran Roman civilization fifteen centuries ago only that in our times it is explicitly stated as a system of thought and conduct. Such a philosophical formulation of principles was quite beyond the Goths, or the Vandals, or Attila's Huns. Their descendants have learned phrases, but not ethical action.

II. THE PREDATORY AIM OF GERMANY

As has been said, the essential aim of the controlling forces in Germany is to dominate the entire world, both politically and commercially, by force of arms wherever necessary, by intrigue everywhere else. This is essentially, in its larger sense, piratical. It merely means that other nations have things which Germany wants, and Germany means to get those things without regard to the method.

PRUSSIAN ROBBERY FROM HER NEIGHBORS

Prussia has been a predatory nation from the first. In 1864 the Prussian government succeeded in getting Austria to combine with it to attack Denmark and to take from it the provinces of Schleswig and Holstein. Whatever might be said of the German population of Holstein and of south Schleswig, there is no doubt that a large part of the province of Schleswig was Danish, and that the population of that province is Danish to this day. It was taken from Denmark merely because Prussia wanted it and had the power to get it. In 1866 Prussia succeeded in forcing on Austria a war over the disposition of the plunder of the War of 1864, and by means of this short war Prussia annexed by force of arms other independent German domains and drove Austria totally out of the organization of Germany as a whole. In 1870 Prussia succeeded in forcing on France a war which, while ostensibly declared by France, was in fact, as we now know by the admission of Bismarck, the result of a trick of his own, he and the military authorities dominant in Prussia being determined to bring the war about. As a result of this the provinces of Alsace and eastern Lorraine, thoroughly French in feeling and by nearly two centuries of life, were torn away from France merely because Prussia wanted them and had the power to get them. At the same time Prussia imposed on France an indemnity of one thousand million dollars. This again was an extortion purely piratical in character, and was made the basis of the future military organization and ambitions of the new German Empire.

As to the economic significance of Alsace-Lorraine, the following is a clear statement of the case:

When Moltke in 1870 insisted upon, and Bismarck against his better judgment assented to, the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, the main thought in their minds was that of securing a strategic frontier. They secured, though they did not know it at the time, something far more valuable than that, something that has proved the base on which Germany has built up her towering fabric of prosperity and power, something without which Germany could not have begun this war or could not have waged it for six months. They secured the largest deposit of iron ore in Europe and the second largest in the world, surpassed in value and extent only by the Lake Superior deposit in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. The soil of the lost provinces has made Germany's fortunes. She has derived from it her metallurgical ascendancy, the motive power for her industries, her wealth, and as a consequence her naval, military, and political power.

The area covered by this deposit embraces the Longwy and Briey districts in France, now occupied by the German armies, and portions of German Lorraine, of Luxemburg, and of Belgium, also for the moment in German possession. If Germany could secure a peace based on her present military position the whole of this wealth of iron ore, estimated at some 5,000,000,000 tons, would pass under her control. As it is, rather more than half the deposit is supposed to lie on the French side of the border and rather less than half in German Lorraine and Luxemburg. That being so, it may be asked why Germany, when she had the chance in 1870, did not annex the entire ore-yielding area instead of allowing it to be divided between France and herself. The answer is that she would undoubtedly have done so had she realized the value of her treasure-trove. But forty-seven years ago metallurgists generally regarded phosphoric ores, which formed the greater part of the Lorraine strata, as worthless and unworkable. The Germans seized everything that in the then state of science was known to be profitable and relinquished the rest to the French. But less than five years later the mining industry was revolutionized by the discovery of a process for dephosphorizing ores. Instantly the value of the ferruginous districts annexed by the Germans was indefinitely multiplied. But at the same time the portions of the basin they had contemptuously allowed to remain in the possession of the French were redeemed at a stroke from comparative worthlessness to a rich productivity.

There are reckoned to be 2,800 million tons of iron ore in all Germany. Of these Lorraine alone is responsible for some 2,000 millions or five-sevenths of the Empire's total supply. When Germany hypothecated the Lorraine beds they were yielding about 500,000 tons of ore a year. In 1875 they still yielded less than three-quarters of a million. Then came Thomas's discovery of the dephosphorizing process and the figures shot up like a rocket until in the year before the war the Germans were extracting from Lorraine over 21,000,000 tons of ore, more than three-fifths of which was produced by the Thomas method. Up to 1903 Germany had no need to import from abroad a single ton of ore. Lorraine alone enabled her to maintain for thirty years an unprecedented industrial expansion. But whether the pace abnormally quickened some ten years before the war, or whether she had commenced to prepare for its outbreak, or whether the Lorraine ores began to deteriorate, Germany between 1903 and 1913 was buying ore abroad in increasing quantities. About one-third of her total consumption was imported from foreign countries in the year preceding the war. That

supply has, of course, for the most part been cut off, and for the past three years Germany has depended almost entirely on the Lorraine mines for the iron and steel which are the basis of all modern warfare. She has got some from the occupied districts of France and Belgium and Luxemburg, but from three-fifths to four-fifths of her output during the war has come from Lorraine. Without the production of the provinces she snatched from France forty-seven years ago Germany would long since have exhausted her capacity for turning out the material of war. Liberate those provinces from her clutch—with their 21,000,000 tons of iron ore a year, their 19,000,000 tons of iron smeltings, their 19,000,000 tons of steel smeltings, and the useful coal fields of the Sarre valley—and a long step has been taken towards binding her down to peace. . . .

The general outline of the issue that the war is shaping and will determine thus becomes clear. Suppose Germany were to win and were to annex the greater half of the ferruginous basin that lies on French soil. Territorially, it would be a very small acquisition. Economically, its value would be inestimable. It would mean that after the war Germany would be able to raise some 46,000,000 tons of iron ore a year while the French output would be reduced to a bare 4,000,000 tons. Suppose, on the other hand, that the Allied victory is as complete as we all intend it shall be and that Alsace-Lorraine is restored to France. The situation in that case would be almost precisely reversed. France would be in a position to extract about 43,000,000 tons of ore a year, and Germany would have to remain satisfied with a maximum yield of some 8,000,000 tons. No blow could more effectually cripple German industrialism, and with it Germany's capacity to organize another war, than the loss of the Lorraine ore beds; and nothing could so certainly and so speedily re-establish the economic equilibrium of France as to regain possession of them. In the fate of Alsace-Lorraine there is involved nothing less than the industrial primacy of Europe.¹

GERMAN CENTRAL EUROPE

The aims of the Pan-German policy are based on the control of a great Central-European dominion by Germany itself. This Central-European dominion comprises in the first place the Germanization of Austria-Hungary, first by a customs union and then by such close bonds as in the case of the North-German Zollverein, forming an intermediate step to actual Prussian political domination.

The Austro-Hungarian monarchy is a curious aggregation of territories and races united under the Hapsburg emperor. The history of this empire in the main consists of the gradual accession of the House of Hapsburg to the sovereignty over one after the other of the various elements, as duke, count, king, or what not. The union, therefore, is essentially personal in the emperor. The title of the emperor of Austria as such dates only from 1806, when the mediaeval Roman Empire was dissolved, and the head of the House of Hapsburg

¹ Sydney Brooks, "The Real Problem of Alsace-Lorraine," *North American Review*, No. 744 (November, 1917), pp. 696, 697, and 699.

assumed the new title of "Emperor of Austria." Since 1867 the monarchy has been dual in character, and the head of the House of Hapsburg reigns as emperor of Austria and king of Hungary. Each of these two portions of the joint monarchy has its own parliament and its own ministry, and there is a common ministry for war, finance, and foreign affairs. The democratic basis of the two parliaments is not substantial, and the emperor and king is able to rule without parliament or in spite of parliament whenever it seems best.

The race elements in the dual monarchy are numerous. In Austria there is a total population of approximately 28 millions; 10 millions of these are Germans, the remaining 18 millions being Slavs and Italians. In Hungary the population is approximately 20 millions. Perhaps 10 millions are Magyars, 2 millions Germans, and 8 millions Slavs and Latins. And further, in the dual monarchy the imperial provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina have a population of almost 2 millions, nearly all Serbian-Slavs.

Thus it will be seen that both in Austria and in Hungary the ruling class is a minority which imposes its will on the majority by force and by legal subtleties.¹ Of the total population in the dual monarchy of about 50 millions there are approximately 12 millions of Germans and 10 millions of Magyars, or 22 millions of the ruling classes. The remaining 28 millions include Slavs and Latins. The Slavs comprise the Céko-Slovaks in Bohemia, Moravia, and eastern Silesia, the Poles in central and western Galicia, and the South-Slavs, including Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes. The Latins include Italians in the South Tyrol and in Trieste and vicinity and Roumanians in Transylvania and Bukowina. The Céks, or Bohemians, are a highly cultivated people, with a history rich in literature, the arts, and free government. The freedom of the Bohemian kingdom historically is as old as that of Hungary, and the desire of the Céks has long been that the emperor of Austria should be crowned as "King of Bohemia," the ancient kingdom thus forming a third element in the monarchy, on a par with Austria and Hungary. The Galician Poles are a fragment of the ancient Polish kingdom, and represent a part of the plunder of that kingdom taken by the House of Hapsburg late in the eighteenth century. The

¹ The Austrian parliament is cunningly juggled in the membership of its lower house. At the sitting in May, 1917—the first meeting since the war broke out—a rabid Pan-German was elected to the presidency by a vote of 215 to 195—215 Germans to 195 non-Germans in a nation in which Germans are in a minority by a ratio of 10 to 18. The election law puts about an average of 42,889 Germans in a parliamentary district, while it takes about 65,479 Slavs to elect one deputy.

Roumanians and the South-Slavs are a remnant forced across the Austrian line from the old independent Serbian and Roumanian kingdoms, which were destroyed by the Turks in the late Middle Ages.

GERMAN AIMS IN THE BALKAN PENINSULA AND IN TURKEY

The next element in this Central-European dominion to be controlled by Germany lies in the Balkan Peninsula. It is quite essential that through Austria-Hungary Germany should be dominant from Austria to the Aegean Sea. This involves control of Serbia and such alliances with the other Balkan states as might easily be effected through the German princelings on their thrones, or by German intermarriage, as in the case of Greece.

The next step involves the Germanization of Turkey. In the guise of an alliance there would be a real political and economic control of that empire, which might then be exploited by German capital. Thus Germany, if this plan for a Central-European state should be carried out, would be dominant from the Baltic Sea to the Persian Gulf.¹

GERMAN AIMS OUTSIDE CENTRAL EUROPE

Central Europe as thus organized is the essential basis of the Pan-German plan for the domination of the rest of Europe. It was believed by the Pan-Germanists that it would be easy for Germany to crush Russia, annex Poland and the Baltic provinces, and very likely the large wheat section of the southeast, thus greatly extending German economic influence and putting an end for all time to the power of Russia in Europe. Again, in the west, if there should be objection to the German domination in Central Europe, Germany could easily crush France, annex the valuable mining and industrial region of the north, annex the Channel ports, seize Belgium, and ultimately intimidate Holland into absorption in the German Empire. This would secure for Germany the valuable ports of the North Sea, which could be made the base of her future naval supremacy, and at the same time would annex to the German Empire the large colonies of Holland and of Belgium, great areas in Africa and Asia and the Asiatic islands which Germany has long coveted. It is obvious that if this plan is carried out the next step will be the destruction of the British Empire. A base of operations in the Channel ports would make it not very difficult a few years later to throw a great army into the Island, and either seize it outright or reduce it to impotence by the exaction of an enormous indemnity.²

¹ Chéradame, chap. v.

² See Appendix A.

GERMAN AIMS IN ASIA AND AFRICA

Meanwhile, subsequent plans for the overthrow of the British Empire in India and for dominance on the China coast are all carefully worked out and on record. The seizure of Egypt would readily follow the control of Turkey, and thus in the long run Africa would become German almost as a whole. The maps found by the Boer conquerors of German Southwest Africa indicated Africa as German from the northern boundaries of the Belgian Congo colonies clear to the Cape, leaving only the little Boer republic as a German suzerainty.¹

GERMAN AIMS IN AMERICA

The plans for Pan-German domination in the Americas are just as well known and just as obvious in their intent. The German colony in southern Brazil was expected to be a base, if need be, of military operations, and through naval and military force and through alliances it was believed that by the middle of the twentieth century at the latest Germany would control practically all the valuable parts of South America. The result as to the Panama Canal and Central America needs no comment, and the Zimmermann note makes very plain the intent of Germany, hoping to combine with Mexico and Japan to dismember the United States, and to extort from it so enormous an indemnity as to make it simply a vassal state of the world-wide German Empire.

These are not the dreams of visionaries. They are actual plans, worked out in great detail, on record, and proved beyond the possibility of doubt as the ultimate aims of the controlling forces in Germany against which the United States is now at war.²

III. GERMAN METHODS

The methods which are to be used and which actually have been used to secure these ends are planned with a total disregard of all the binding rules of law. The violation of treaties in the attack on Belgium and in the German policy with regard to the United States is perfectly well known. The treaty of guaranty signed by Prussia and by Austria was intended to secure Belgium from attack. Regardless of that treaty Belgium was promptly invaded when Germany went to war with France in 1914.³ Treaties between Prussia and the United States made in 1787 and 1799 and in 1828, repeatedly held to be still binding by the governments of both countries, explicitly recognize the validity of

¹ See Appendix C.

² See Appendix A.

³ See Appendix E.

commercial dealings between a neutral power and a belligerent in all matters of commerce, including contraband. And yet in violation of that treaty Germany proposes to destroy that commerce without warning and without regard to the innocent persons on the ship to be sunk.¹ The lawless bombardment of crowded cities which are not besieged, whereby civilians, men, women, and children, lose their lives, is another method which is contrary to all the aims and hopes of the nations parties to the Hague Conventions.

Moreover, we find the world covered by a network of German intrigue. When immigrants come to the United States, make their homes here, and become naturalized citizens, we expect them to give their absolute and unquestioned loyalty to the country of their choice. They take an oath of allegiance distinctly forswearing allegiance to the country of origin. This principle of a transfer of allegiance has been recognized, not merely in the legislation of the United States, but in treaties between the United States and other countries, with the North-German Union, the predecessor of the German Empire, for instance, in 1868. In 1913 the German parliament, however, passed an act providing that Germans who become naturalized in another country need not lose their German national character.² They may file their desire to retain that national character with the proper German officers, and with the consent of the German consul they may be regarded as still remaining in all respects Germans. After that they may then go through the process of naturalization, and in so doing distinctly perjure themselves. It was believed that by that method there would be in other countries a body of Germans ostensibly of those countries who yet would be primarily loyal to the country of origin, and could be counted on to influence the country of their home politically in favor of Germany, and in case of war could be counted on actually to join the German armies. Indeed, it was believed confidently that in case of war between Germany and the United States there would be a German insurrection in the central western states. These beliefs I think are entirely erroneous. Very few naturalized Germans in my opinion are not primarily loyal to the country to which they have sworn allegiance. Germany totally misunderstands the psychology of almost every other nation. But in this act of 1913, which was to take effect January 1, 1914, we can see plainly the intent, not of the Pan-German Union alone, but of the German government, to implant a source of treachery in other countries.

¹ See Appendix D.

² See Appendix F.

I need not dwell on the elaborate conspiracies carried on in this country under the direction of the imperial ambassadors both from Austria and from Germany in violation of the courtesy of a guest and in violation of the laws of the United States.

CONCLUSION

We are dealing, therefore, with a vast, world-wide conspiracy which has for its end the subversion in the long run of the liberty of practically every free nation, and which means, if the conspiracy succeeds, the overthrow of the independence of the United States. In other words, we are engaged in a great battle for the liberty of all free countries.

Anything short of a complete victory over the Teutonic powers will result in a mere truce, to be followed by a renewal of war within a few years. Every nation would have to arm and to keep armed. International relations would be on the one hand a series of German intrigues to divide the present Allies so as to renew the attack under more favorable auspices, and on the other hand endless attempts to frustrate such conspiracies. The whole world would be full of plots and counter-plots, suspicion and fear, with the inevitable result of another bloody struggle. Assurance of a peace relatively permanent cannot depend on treaties; no treaty obligation would bind Germany or Austria-Hungary under their present ruling forces. The only safety for the world can be found in a complete victory over the Teutonic empires and in establishing as a guaranty a state of things which would make it exceedingly difficult for them to make another assault on civilization with reasonable hope of success.

APPENDIX A

WHAT GERMANY EXPECTS TO GET BY CONQUEST

Ernst Haeckel in *Das monistische Jahrhundert*, No. 31-32 (November 16, 1914), p. 657:

In my view the following fruits of victory are highly desirable for the future of Germany, and at the same time for the future of federated Continental Europe: (1) Liberation from the tyranny of England. (2) As a necessary means to this end, invasion of the British pirate state by the German navy and army, occupation of London. (3) Division of Belgium: the largest part, as far west as Antwerp and Ostend, a state in the German Empire; the northern part to Holland; the eastern part to Luxemburg—also, thus enlarged, a state in the German Empire. (4) Germany obtains a great part of the British colonies as well as the Congo state. (5) France must cede a portion of her

neighboring northeastern provinces. (6) Russia is to be made powerless by restoring the kingdom of Poland and connecting this with Austria-Hungary. (7) The German Baltic provinces revert to the German Empire. (8) Finland becomes an independent Kingdom and is to be connected with Sweden. . . .

Petition to the Imperial Chancellor, voted June 20, 1915, at a meeting of professors, diplomatists, and higher officials in active service, held in the Künstlerhaus at Berlin. It was handed in with the signatures of 352 professors of universities and of special schools of the same rank, 158 school teachers and clergymen, 145 superior administrative officers, mayors, and city councilmen, 148 judges and advocates, 40 members of the Reichstag, 182 representatives of industry, commerce, and banking, 52 landed proprietors, and 252 artists, writers, and publishers. It was circulated only as a "strictly confidential manuscript." The full text is given in Grumbach, *Das annexionistische Deutschland, 1917*, pp. 132-40.

. . . . The military results already gained in this war at the cost of so great sacrifices should be utilized to the extreme attainable limit. This is the fixed determination of the German people.

1. *France*.—We must ruthlessly weaken this country politically and economically for the sake of our own existence, and we must improve against her our strategical position. For this purpose, according to our conviction, *a thorough improvement of our whole west front from Belfort to the coast is necessary*. We must conquer as great a part as possible of the North-French Channel coast, in order to obtain greater strategical security against England and a better outlet to the ocean. . . .

To avoid such conditions as exist in Alsace-Lorraine *the enterprises and possessions that give economic power are to be transferred from hostile to German hands, the previous owners being taken over and compensated by France*. To the part of the population that we take over no influence whatever in the Empire is to be conceded.

We must also remember that this country has disproportionately large colonial possessions and that England can indemnify herself in these possessions if we do not anticipate her.

2. *Belgium*.—We must keep Belgium firmly in our hands as regards political and military matters and as regards economic interests. In no matter is the German nation more united in its opinion: to it the retention of Belgium is an indubitable matter of honor.

. . . . Belgium will bring us an immense increase of economic power. As regards population, she also give us an important increase, particularly if the Flemish element, which in its culture is so closely related to us, can in course of time be freed from the artificial Latinizing influences that surround it and be brought back to its Teutonic character.

. . . . To the inhabitants of Belgium no political influence in the Empire is to be conceded; and, as in the districts to be ceded by France, the most important enterprises and landed estates are to be transferred from hostile to German hands.

3. *Russia.*—On our eastern frontier the population of the Russian Empire is increasing at a monstrous rate—at a rate of something like two and one-half millions a year. Within a generation the population will amount to 250,000,-000. Against this overwhelming preponderance on our eastern flank Germany can assert herself only if she sets up a strong barrier and if on the other hand the healthy growth of our own population is furthered by all possible means. *Such a barrier and also a basis for safeguarding the growth of our own population are to be found in the territory that Russia must cede to us.* This must be agricultural land adapted to settlement. Land that gives us a healthy peasantry, this fresh fountain of all national and political power. Land that can take over a part of our increase of population and offer to returning Germans who desire to turn their backs upon the hostile foreign world a new home in the old home. . . . Such land, required for our physical, moral, and spiritual health, is to be found first of all in the East. . . .

This land will also serve to defray the Russian war indemnity. . . . *Russia is over-rich in land, and the land of which she is to cede us political control we shall demand freed for the most part from private titles.* The Russian population is not so strongly rooted in the land as is that of Western and Central Europe. Russia itself has repeatedly transplanted large parts of its population to remote districts. . . .

4. *England, the East, colonies, and the world across the seas.*—We admit that the blockade by which England has transformed Germany during the period of the war into a closed commercial state has taught us something. It has taught us above all that, as has been explained in the earlier sections of this memorial, we must make ourselves as independent as possible in all political, military, and economic matters, on the basis of an expanded and better-secured home territory in Europe. Similarly we must organize upon the Continent, in immediate connection with our land frontiers the broadest possible Continental economic domain. . . . For this purpose *it is important permanently to secure Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, Turkey, and Asia Minor to the Persian Gulf against Russian and English ambitions.*

In the next place it is important to secure, in spite of England, our re-entry into the economic world beyond the seas. . . . *In Africa we must rebuild our Colonial Empire more solidly and more strongly than before.* Here again the importance of a permanent connection with the world of Islam makes itself felt, and also the necessity of secure passage over the seas independent of the good or ill will of England. . . .

It has already been pointed out that we must keep Belgium firmly under our control and must also obtain as much as possible of the North French Channel coast. *It is important, besides, to break up the chain of maritime bases which England has thrown about the world or to enfeeble it by a corresponding acquisition of German bases.* Egypt, which connects English Africa with English Asia, and, with Australia as a further barrier, converts the Indian Ocean into an English lake—Egypt, which maintains the connection between

the mother-country and all its oriental colonies, is, as Bismarck expressed it, the neck of the English world-empire. . . . There England may be struck in its most vital nerve. . . .

5. *War indemnity.*—It is probably France that comes into consideration, primarily if not exclusively, as regards any financial indemnification for the costs of the war. *We should not hesitate, from any false humanity, to burden France as heavily as possible.* To ease the burden imposed upon her she may call upon her ally across the Channel. If the latter refuses to fulfil her duties as an ally financially, a secondary political result might be attained with which we could well be content. . . .

6. *No policy of culture without a policy of power.*—If the undersigned, and particularly the men of science, or art, and of the church among them, should be reproached for setting up only political, economic, and perhaps social demands and forgetting the purely spiritual problems of the German future, our answer is a threefold one.

The care of the German spirit is not one of the aims of war nor one of the conditions of peace.

If, however, we are to say anything concerning the German spirit . . . first of all, Germany must be able to live in political and economic security before it can pursue its spiritual vocation in freedom.

Finally . . . we do not desire a *German spirit that is in danger of suffering decomposition and of working also as a decomposing agency*—a national spirit that, lacking root, is forced to seek a home in all countries, and to seek it in vain; *that must everywhere adapt itself and falsify its own nature as well as the nature of the nations that grant it hospitality.* . . . In our demands we are seeking to gain for the German spirit a healthy body. . . .

We are conscious of setting up goals that can be reached only through a resolute spirit of sacrifice and through most energetic diplomacy. But we invoke a saying of Bismarck's: "More than in any other domain it is true in politics that faith tangibly removes mountains, that courage and victory are not causally connected but identical."

Otto Richard von Tannenberg, *Grossdeutschland: Die Aufgabe des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts*, 1911, pp. 219, 220, 230, 231:

It would be the beginning of a world-empire, our first empire of the sort, if to East Africa, Cameroon, and Southeast Africa we should add Angola and the Belgian and French Congo. . . . In the way of this first world-empire stand Portugal, France, and England. Portugal and France will be the mourners. England will not be able to hinder it. This will not be accomplished today nor tomorrow; but a day will come when Europe will settle her accounts. On that day the reservists of Nimes will go on strike, if the sons of the German heroes of Metz and of Sedan attack them in rainy weather. On that day the English Channel will be paved with French submarines of the

successful *Pluviose* type, if the German dreadnoughts bombard the French ports of the North Sea.

. . . Our fathers have left us much to do. In compensation, *the German nation holds a position among the European Powers that permits it at once to reach its goal by a single rapid rush*. At the present time the German nation finds itself in a position similar to that of Prussia at the beginning of the reign of Frederick the Great. He raised his country to the rank of a great European Power. *It is Germany's task today to pass from the position of a European Power to that of a World-Power.*

The German people must take possession of Central Africa from the mouth of the Orange River to Lake Tchad and from the Cameroon Mountains to the mouth of the river Rovuna. They must take possession of Asia Minor, of the Malayan Archipelago in Southeastern Asia, and finally of the southern half of South America. Only then will Germany possess a colonial empire that will correspond to her actual power.

A policy of sentiment is folly. Enthusiasm for humanity is idiocy. Charity should begin among one's compatriots. Politics is business. Right and wrong are notions needed in civil life only.

The German people is always right, because it is the German people and because it numbers 87,000,000. Our fathers have left us much to do.

A. Oelzelt-Newin, *Welche Strafe soll die treffen, die Schuld am Weltkrieg tragen*, 1915, pp. 12-16:

*Russia is by far the most dangerous enemy, not only of Middle Europe, but of all Europe and of the whole civilized world. . . . The object of any treaty of peace must therefore be to preserve Russia's Asiatic character and, so far as possible, to weaken her position as a European Great Power. This can be done only by taking from her those western territories which are most valuable from the cultural and the economic points of view and by keeping her away at the same time from all European seas (except the White Sea). . . . The boundary that should be drawn would . . . run from Kronstadt by way of Brest-Litovsk and Taganrog to Baku, Finland, of course, being included. Besides the razing of all Russia's western fortresses, especially the fortresses on the sea, it would be necessary to take from her *Finland, Esthonia, Livonia, Kurland, Poland, Volhynia, Podolia, Bessarabia, portions of Little Russia and of South Russia, Taurida (Krim) and the Caucasus*. . . . In the Balkans, if these are freed from Russian assistance and intrigues, two kingdoms, *Servia and Montenegro, should be wiped completely off the map*. . . .*

There can be no united and powerful Middle Europe so long as *France* retains her present size and power. To deprive her of these must be the object of any treaty of peace. Of course it is not a question solely of acquisition of territory, for nations can be ruined by war indemnities or by commercial treaties, but of these we are not talking at present. We are asking only,

What cessions of territory are necessary in order to lessen by two the number of Great Powers in Europe? What is necessary for this purpose?

Whether the cession of *northern seaports* will come into question is a matter that had better not be discussed at present. Possibly the Middle States may even need a port on the Mediterranean like *Toulon*, which would necessarily involve the annexation of *Nice*. . . . That France must lose all the *north coast of Africa* that belongs to her is the more certain because she would not be sufficiently crippled by war indemnities alone. Nor would it be enough to insist on the *transfer of her fleet*, but among her *fortresses* those that protect harbors must first be razed; and one of the most important conditions of peace that we should strive to obtain would be that she should maintain only a commercial fleet. *France should be forced into a position similar to that now held by Spain.* . . .

. . . The punishment that *England* would find most severe would perhaps be her *complete exclusion from the Mediterranean*. . . . She would be shut off from Malta and the other islands if Gibraltar were taken from her and if Tangiers ceased to be neutral. . . . If any part of these protecting walls is defectively constructed, our culture will be permanently injured or perhaps annihilated before another generation. Then the great sacrifice of life would have been made, not for life, but only for death.

Albert Ritter, *Der organische Aufbau Europas*, 1916, pp. 27-28:

Middle Europe must consider strategic necessities in fixing her eastern boundaries. . . . *East Prussia needs stronger protection on the North and on the East*. . . . In the west military considerations demand a greater extension of the geographic boundary. . . . If the military object of gaining permanent security against France and also the freedom of the seas is to be really attained, *the northeastern part of France, as a number of leading statesmen have already indicated, must be brought within the German northwestern frontier*, as far as the mouth of the Somme, somewhere along the line Vignacourt-Bapaume-Verdun-St. Mihiel-Pont à Mousson. . . . The establishment of this frontier, together with the taking of *Belfort and its environs*, which are necessary for the protection of South Germany, seems thoroughly justified. . . . As regards the *annexation of Belgium* to Middle Europe, to which the majority of its inhabitants belong as regards language, no further words need be wasted; it is a matter of course.

In the southwest the geographical frontier must in like manner be pushed forward, in order that Triest, one of the most important points for Middle Europe, may be removed from hostile attack. . . . *The northern part of Venetia*, the districts of Friuli and Treviso, up to a line running from the south end of Lake Garda to the mouth of the Piave, must be taken as a glacis at the foot of the Alps in order to ward off from Austria's Adriatic coast all future

menace. On national grounds, however, this necessary line of security may and will be pushed forward a few kilometers. . . .

Albert Ritter ("Konrad von Winterstetten"), *Nordkap-Bagdad*, 1915, pp. 33, 34:

. . . In general, the problem of making England . . . innocuous and her overthrow as useful as possible for us may best be solved if we make ourselves masters (from a military point of view) of the European center of the British Empire. The road from Gravelotte and Verdun to Dunkirk and Boulogne might be continued by the occupation of a bridgehead at Dover—a castle on English soil. This proposal may seem fantastic, but it is quite as easy to carry it through as a landing on British soil, and without this the war must last for years. *Only the taking of London, which we shall live to see, will make peace possible*, and after the taking of London one treaty provision may just as well be exacted as another. . . .

"Wann wird der Krieg beendigt sein?" by "Diplomaticus," October, 1914, p. 16:

[Our enemies] must also pay, and must pay a very high price, for the injuries they have inflicted upon our interests and upon our good name by the lies they have spread over the whole world. *Germany must insist that, in the treaty of peace to be signed by our enemies, they themselves shall confess that they forced the war upon us and that they have lied to the whole civilized world. So only can we stand justified before the tribunal of history.*

A memorial, dated May 20, 1915, was addressed to the imperial Chancellor by six of the most important agricultural and industrial associations of Germany: "Bund der Landwirte," "Deutscher Bauernbund," "Vorort der christlichen deutschen Bauernvereine," "Centralverband deutscher Industriellen," "Bund der Industriellen," and "Reichsdeutscher Mittelstandsverband." It was transmitted to the governments of the several German states and was extensively circulated in print as a "confidential" communication. Its publication in German newspapers was not permitted. The entire text was first published in the Paris *Humanité*, August 11, 1915. The complete German text is given in Grumbach, *Das annexionistische Deutschland*, pp. 123-32.

. . . In addition to the demand for a colonial empire that shall fully satisfy the many-sided economic interests of Germany, in addition to securing our future in the matter of customs and trade policy and the attainment of a sufficient . . . war indemnity, [the undersigned associations] find the chief aim of the conflict that has been forced upon us in the securing and improvement of the German Empire's basis of existence in Europe and particularly in the following directions:

Belgium . . . as regards military and customs policy, and also as regards monetary, banking, and postal systems, must be subjected to German imperial legislation. Railroads and canals are to be made portions of our transportation

system. For the rest, after separating the country into a Walloon district and a preponderantly Flemish district, and *after transferring to Germans economic undertakings and possessions that are important for the domination of the country, its government and administration must be so conducted that the inhabitants shall obtain no influence upon the political destinies of the German Empire.*

As regards France *the possession of the coast beyond the Belgian frontier, perhaps to the Somme*, and therewith an outlet to the Atlantic Ocean, must be regarded as vital to our future importance on the sea. *The hinterland that is to be acquired with this coast strip* must be sufficient to secure complete strategic control and economic exploitation of the ports that we acquire on the Channel. Apart from the necessary acquisition of the ore fields of Briey, any further annexation of French territory is to be made exclusively on considerations of military strategy. It may be assumed as self-evident after the experiences of this war, that we cannot leave in the hands of the enemy the fortified positions which threaten us, particularly Verdun and Belfort, nor the western slope of the Vosges that lies between them. *The acquisition of the line of the Meuse and the French coast on the Channel involves, in addition to the above-mentioned ore fields of Briey, also the possession of the coal fields in the Departments of the North and of Pas-de-Calais.* After our experiences in Alsace-Lorraine, it is probably self-evident that in these acquisitions also *the people of the annexed districts are not to be put in a position to obtain any political influence upon the destinies of the German Empire, and that the economic resources to be found in these districts, including medium and large land holdings, are to be put into German hands*, with an arrangement that France shall indemnify and take care of the former proprietors. . . .

The need for strengthening also the sound agricultural basis of our national economy demands a considerable extension of the imperial and Prussian frontiers toward the East, by annexing parts at least of the *Baltic provinces and the districts lying south of the same*, taking into consideration at the same time the object of making our East-German frontier defensible from a military point of view. . . .

As regards the extension of political rights to the inhabitants of these new territories and the safeguarding of the German economic influence therein, what has been said as regards France is valid here also. The war indemnity to be paid by Russia must consist largely in the transfer of private titles to land.

APPENDIX B

GERMAN INTRIGUES AGAINST AMERICA IN TIME OF PEACE

BY THE U.S. BUREAU OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, JUNE, 1917

Evidence of the bad faith of the Imperial German government soon piled up on every hand. Honest efforts on our part to establish a firm basis of good neighborliness with the German people were met by their government with

quibbles, misrepresentations, and counteraccusations against their enemies abroad. And meanwhile in this country official agents of the Central Powers—protected from criminal prosecution by diplomatic immunity—conspired against our internal peace, placed spies and agents provocateurs throughout the length and breadth of our land, and even in high positions of trust in departments of our government. While expressing a cordial friendship for the people of the United States, the government of Germany had its agents at work both in Latin America and in Japan. They bought or subsidized papers and supported speakers there to rouse feelings of bitterness and distrust against us in those friendly nations, in order to embroil us in war. They were inciting to insurrection in Cuba, in Haiti, and in Santo Domingo; their hostile hand was stretched out to take the Danish Islands; and everywhere in South America they were abroad sowing the seeds of dissension, trying to stir up one nation against another and all against the United States. In their sum these various operations amounted to direct assault upon the Monroe Doctrine. And even if we had given up our right to travel on the sea, even if we had surrendered to German threats and abandoned our legitimate trade in munitions, the German offensive in the New World, in our own land and among our neighbors, was becoming too serious to be ignored.

So long as it was possible, the government of the United States tried to believe that such activities, the evidence of which was already in a large measure at hand, were the work of irresponsible and misguided individuals. It was only reluctantly, in the face of overwhelming proof, that the recall of the Austro-Hungarian ambassador and of the German military and naval attachés was demanded. Proof of their criminal violations of our hospitality was presented to their governments. But these governments, in reply, offered no apologies nor did they issue reprimands. It became clear that such intrigue was their settled policy.¹

On the first of February we intend to begin submarine warfare unrestricted. In spite of this it is our intention to endeavor to keep neutral the United States of America.

If this attempt is not successful, we propose an alliance on the following basis with Mexico:

That we shall make war together and together make peace. We shall give general financial support and it is understood that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona. The details are left to you for settlement.

You are instructed to inform the President of Mexico of the above in the greatest confidence as soon as it is certain that there will be an outbreak of war with the United States, and suggest that the President of Mexico, on his own

¹ "War Information Series": *How the War Came to America*.

initiative, should communicate with Japan suggesting adherence at once to this plan; at the same time offer to mediate between Germany and Japan.

Please call to the attention of the President of Mexico that the employment of ruthless submarine warfare now promises to compel England to make peace in a few months.¹

(Signed) ZIMMERMANN

APPENDIX C

GERMAN DOMINATION IN SOUTH AMERICA

The German colonies in southern Brazil and Uruguay are the one bright spot in this gloomy picture of South American civilization. Here dwell some half-million Germans; and it is to be hoped that by the reorganization of South America, when the half-breed population—a cross between the Indians and the Latin races—has disappeared, the vast basin of the La Plata will become German territory. The Germans in southern Brazil—like the Boers in South Africa—have, on the average, twelve to fifteen children; so that, by this natural increase alone, the country is assured to us. In these circumstances is it not wonderful that the German people has not long since decided to take possession of this territory? For the people of the republics which have inherited the former domains of Spain and Portugal it would be altogether a blessing to become subject to German power. They would soon be reconciled to our rule and be proud of their part in the world-wide glory of the German name.²

APPENDIX D

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND PRUSSIA—1785

ARTICLE XII.—If one of the contracting parties should be engaged in war with any other Power, the free intercourse and commerce of the subjects or citizens of the party remaining neuter with the belligerent Powers shall not be interrupted. On the contrary, in that case, as in full peace, the vessels of the neutral party may navigate freely to and from the ports and on the coasts of the belligerent parties, free vessels making free goods, insomuch that all things shall be adjudged free which shall be on board any vessel belonging to the neutral party, although such things belong to an enemy of the other; and the same freedom shall be extended to persons who shall be on board a free vessel, although they should be enemies to the other party, unless they be soldiers in actual service of such enemy.

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND PRUSSIA—1799

ARTICLE XIII.—And in the same case of one of the contracting parties being engaged in war with any other Power, to prevent all the difficulties and

¹ Intercepted dispatch of the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the German Minister in Mexico.

² Tannenberg, *Grossdeutschland*, p. 295.

misunderstandings that usually arise respecting merchandise of contraband, such as arms, ammunition, and military stores of every kind, no such articles carried in the vessels, or by the subjects or citizens of either party, to the enemies of the other, shall be deemed contraband, so as to induce confiscation or condemnation and a loss of property to individuals. Nevertheless, it shall be lawful to stop such vessels and articles, and to detain them for such length of time as the captors may think necessary to prevent the inconvenience or damage that might ensue from their proceeding, paying, however, a reasonable compensation for the loss such arrest shall occasion to the proprietors; and it shall further be allowed to use in the service of the captors the whole or any part of the military stores so detained, paying the owners the full value of the same to be ascertained by the current price at the place of its destination. But in the case supposed of a vessel stopped for articles of contraband, if the master of the vessel stopped will deliver out the goods supposed to be of contraband nature, he shall be admitted to do it, and the vessel shall not in that case be carried into any port, nor further detained, but shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage.

All cannons, mortars, firearms, pistols, bombs, grenades, bullets, balls, muskets, flints, matches, powder, saltpeter, sulphur, cuirasses, pikes, swords, belts, cartouch boxes, saddles, and bridles, beyond the quantity necessary for the use of the ship, or beyond that which every man serving on board the vessel, or passenger, ought to have; and in general whatever is comprised under the denomination of arms and military stores, of what description soever, shall be deemed objects of contraband.

ARTICLE XXIII.—If war should arise between the two contracting parties, the merchants of either country then residing in the other shall be allowed to remain nine months to collect their debts and settle their affairs, and may depart freely, carrying off all their effects without molestation or hindrance; and all women and children, scholars of every faculty, cultivators of the earth, artisans, manufacturers, and fishermen, unarmed and inhabiting unfortified towns, villages, or places and, in general, all others whose occupations are for the common subsistence and benefit of mankind, shall be allowed to continue their respective employments, and shall not be molested in their persons, nor shall their houses or goods be burnt or otherwise destroyed, nor their fields wasted by the armed force of the enemy, into whose power by the events of war they may happen to fall; but if anything is necessary to be taken from them for the use of such armed force, the same shall be paid for at a reasonable price.

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND PRUSSIA—1828

ARTICLE XII.—The twelfth article of the treaty of amity and commerce, concluded between the parties in 1785, and the articles from the thirteenth to the twenty-fourth, inclusive, of that which was concluded at Berlin in 1799, with the exception of the last paragraph in the nineteenth article, relating to

treaties with Great Britain, are hereby revived with the same force and virtue as if they made part of the context of the present treaty, it being, however, understood that the stipulations contained in the articles thus revived shall be always considered as in no manner affecting the treaties or conventions concluded by either party with other Powers, during the interval between the expiration of the said treaty of 1799, and the commencement of the operation of the present treaty.

The parties being still desirous, in conformity with their intention declared in the twelfth article of the said treaty of 1799, to establish between themselves, or in concert with other maritime Powers, further provisions to insure just protection and freedom to neutral navigation and commerce, and which may at the same time advance the cause of civilization of humanity, engage again to treat on this subject at some future and convenient period.

APPENDIX E

TREATY OF LONDON, NOVEMBER 15, 1831

ARTICLE VII.—Belgium, within the limits indicated in Articles I and II, Sec. 4, will form an independent and perpetually neutral State. It will be required to observe this same neutrality toward all other States.

ARTICLE XXV.—The Courts of Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia guarantee to his Majesty, the King of the Belgians, the execution of all the preceding articles.

[The engagements contained in this treaty were renewed by that of 1839, which definitely established the status of Belgium and recognized that all the articles of the treaty of 1831 were placed under the guaranty of the five Powers.]

TREATY OF LONDON, MAY 11, 1867

ARTICLE II.—The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, within the limits determined by the act annexed to the treaty of April 19, 1839, under the guaranty of the courts of France, Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, will henceforth form a perpetually neutral State. It will be required to observe this same neutrality toward all other States. The high contracting parties bind themselves to respect the principle of neutrality stipulated by the present article. The latter is and continues to be placed under the sanction of the collective guaranty of the Powers who are signatories to the present treaty, with the exception of Belgium, which is itself a neutral State.

APPENDIX F

STATUTE ENACTED BY THE GERMAN PARLIAMENT, JULY 22, 1913. TO GO INTO EFFECT JANUARY 1, 1914

A German who is neither domiciled nor permanently resident in this country loses his German nationality by the acquisition of a foreign nationality, if this acquisition is at his request or at the request of the husband or

of the guardian, and if, in the case of a wife or a ward, the conditions exist under which, according to articles 18 and 19, a petition is admissible to be dismissed from German allegiance. The German nationality is not lost by one who prior to acquiring the foreign nationality has upon his petition obtained the written authority of the competent official of his native state to retain his German nationality. Before this authority is granted the German consul must be heard. The Chancellor with the consent of the Federal Council may ordain that the authority provided for in this paragraph shall not be granted to persons who desire to acquire the nationality of designated foreign states.

A SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHY

There are innumerable books and pamphlets dealing with war questions from the point of view of all the belligerents. A few only are mentioned below, which it is believed are especially significant. In some of these further bibliographies will be found.

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How the War Came to the United States; No. 1. *The War Message and the Facts behind It*; No. 3. Hazen, *The Government of Germany*, No. 4. McLaughlin, *The Great War, from Spectator to Participant*; No. 6. *American Loyalty*, by Citizens of German Descent.

The University of Chicago War Papers

No. 2

AMERICANS AND THE WORLD-CRISIS

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CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

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Published January 1918

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

THE BAKER & TAYLOR COMPANY
NEW YORK

THE J. K. GILL COMPANY
PORTLAND, OREGON

THE CUNNINGHAM, CURTISS & WELCH COMPANY
LOS ANGELES

THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON AND EDINBURGH

THE MARUZEN-KABUSHIKI-KAISHA
TOKYO, OSAKA, KYOTO, FUKUOKA, SENDAI

THE MISSION BOOK COMPANY
SHANGHAI

AMERICANS AND THE WORLD-CRISIS

NOTE.—In its original form this paper was a Commencement address delivered at Colby College, June 17, 1917. It was published in the *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXIII, No. 2. The present version omits certain portions which have meanwhile lost their pertinence.

Since August, 1914, the nations have been groping in darkness about the meaning of the world-crisis. At first the unsophisticated saw in it only a local European quarrel. Then it relentlessly engulfed the world. The stars in their courses have meanwhile merged into illuminators of the crisis. Slowly but surely the truth has dawned, even upon the reluctant mind of the patriotic but incredulous President of the United States. Never in history has the moral principle at issue in a war been clearer than in the present struggle. We have only to disregard details and to look straight at the substance of the whole matter. *The question which dwarfs and ought to silence all the rest is whether this generation will doom coming generations to live in a world in which might has reconquered right, or whether this generation will endow coming generations with a heritage of right controlling might.*

It is not necessary to find a convincing answer to the question, What caused the war? Whether we have a formula which suits ourselves in reply to that question or not, a much more important question is now foremost. Whatever the complex of causes and effects which literally released the forces at present beyond control, that complex is not identical with the group of problems involved in the task of restoring control. On the contrary, granting that the explosion of 1914 was a resultant of all the racial, commercial, dynastic, and political rivalries which have been charged with the responsibility; granting that neither of the combatants is guiltless of some share of the wrong which entered into the catastrophe; granting that each nation stands convicted of its own portion of these epic guilts; granting that neither of the powers, our own country not excepted, can conceal its Macbeth hands by historic

misdeeds deep-stained enough the multitudinous seas to incarnadine—the present crisis is none of these nor all combined. It is not primarily a struggle of race against race, of ruler against ruler, of trader against trader, of war lord against war lord, of this form of government against that form of government; although each of these antitheses is many times implicated. Least of all is it a purgatory out of which any nation will emerge absolved of any or all past sins. If we try to see with the eyes of future historians, and if we borrow a term from the vocabulary of the psychologists, we may reduce the situation to a trial of strength between two irreconcilable national psychoses. For convenience we may as well adopt the manner of Herbert Spencer and designate the conflicting forces as a militant versus a moral psychosis.

I will not apologize for this dangerous way of speaking. Always, of course, human affairs are matters, not of impersonal forces, but of intensely personal people. It especially behooves everyone who interprets the present crisis as I do to give this literal fact full force. For safety's sake, therefore, I will translate this convenient academic manner of speaking, to which I shall revert, into less convenient, but also less misleading, literal form: The world is divided today between a group of nations whose units have delivered themselves over to the dictation of an artificial, arbitrary, anti-moral, militaristically imposed code, according to which force is the arbiter of right, and another group of nations driven by the instinct of self-preservation into championship of a morality which makes its appeal to justice as its standard—to the level of which appeal I freely admit they might not have risen for many generations if they had not confronted the alternative of choosing between a self-assertion better than their previous best selves and consent that the foundations of all international morality should be destroyed.

Among the most indelible memory-pictures in my mind is a series reproducing incidents, trifling in themselves, but eloquent as reflections of popular feeling, which occurred in Bangor, Maine, on the day and the following days after the message had come over the wire: "A madman has murdered Abraham Lincoln."

Suppose the message had read instead: "Abraham Lincoln has become violently insane." Suppose the malady had taken the

form of acute mania, in the name of freedom, to force the conduct, not only of Lincoln's immediate associates, but of the whole world. The emotions of the people would not have been converted into hate toward Lincoln. Quite likely the latent love and veneration of the loyal states would have responded with pity more intense than the sorrow that surrounded his death. Nevertheless, after recovery from the first shock there would have been little difference of opinion in principle about the duty of taking all necessary measures to restrain the sufferer from violence to himself and others, of adopting every known means of restoration, and, above all, of reorganizing the administration in closest possible conformity with the fundamental law and with the most unequivocal devotion to the public good.

There are instructive analogies between the moral demands which would have challenged Americans if this fictitious reconstruction of the historical incident had been the reality, and the demands of the present world-crisis upon all people who believe in the rule of right rather than the rule of force.

Since August, 1914, it has been said countless times, all over the world, that Germany is a nation gone mad. As the Germans have committed themselves deeper and deeper, month after month, to detail after detail of the preposterous implications of their national prepossession, the rest of the world has been forced to the conclusion, often against almost invincible preconceptions, that the diagnosis is not a figure of speech but stark truth.

Did you ever have a dear friend, of gentle heart, of brilliant mind, of refined tastes, of sensitive conscience, of high purpose—but suddenly bereft of reason? Instead of becoming demented, did that rarely gifted friend re-enlist all his disordered powers in pathologically energized pursuit of an uncannily perverted purpose? Did that friend betray those enviable traits into unrestricted service of a ruthlessly destructive idea? If you have such a picture as that in mind, it is also symbolically a veracious miniature of present Germany. Never was more impressive unity than the Germans have been displaying for the past three years. Yet it is a unity that is terrific—appalling—because it is splendid physical, mental, and moral strength misdirected by a Satanic obsession.

This aberration has resulted from the most deliberate, the most insidious, the most methodical, the most mentally and morally stultifying, program of national self-intoxication that human imagination has ever conceived.

The book which on the whole has impressed me as the most astonishing literary betrayal of the present German state of mind was written, not from the soldier's standpoint at all, but by a man who speaks primarily for Germany's colonizing and missionizing—Paul Rohrbach. The title of the book is *Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt*. Since the war began, an English translation has appeared. I have not seen a copy, but if literally rendered the title would be: *The German Idea in the World*. According to the author's explicit declaration, the "German idea" is conviction of the duty of the Germans to impose upon the rest of the world their superior ethical standard! Not content to let the absurdity of this self-righteousness stand by itself, the author actually makes the body of his book an argument to his fellow-Germans to realize this aim, *for the reason that thus far they have failed in every essential quality which is necessary to ethical superiority!*

In its large features, standing forth in results rather than demonstrable in terms of the precise details of cause and effect, the process which has culminated in the present perverted condition of German political consciousness is one of the most open secrets in history. In the main it has been an interplay of two reciprocating factors, each in turn stimulating and stimulated by the other, and even at times merely phases of each other. These factors have not conformed in minutiae to a discoverable scheme of rhythm, or of logical or chronological sequence. On the whole, each in itself and both in co-operation have been accumulating influence for more than two hundred years.

The first of these factors of the present German psychosis has been the increasing success of Prussia as a military machine. From the moment in 1713 when Frederick William the First began his drill-sergeanting of his Prussians, followed by the forty-six years in which his son more than satisfied the military conditions for his honorary title "The Great," through the vacillating reigns of Frederick William Second, Third, Fourth, and even of William the

First of the present Empire—a period in which all the artificialities of political, literary, and moral sycophancy had to be under sleepless mobilization to guard the Prussian people from discovering from what mediocre stuff the mythology of the Hohenzollern House was being constructed—to the proclamation of the Empire at Versailles in 1871, on the whole there was cumulative cogency in the militarists' appeal to fact: "Remember what a helpless folk the Germans were from the beginnings of the decline of the Holy Roman Empire, and behold what the Prussian monarchy and the Prussian army have achieved!" At our remove from the facts it is easy to remember that the epitaph of most military states might well be, "He that taketh the sword shall perish by the sword." Yet, if we can imagine ourselves open to conviction that a single case, and that a case which has not yet run its full course, may be generalized into a valid historical law, we are in a position to understand how the Germans yielded to the lure of the fallacy that military aggression is the sole assurance of national greatness.

The second factor is primarily subjective and schematic. It is the factor in which the deeds of Prussian men of action reappear, "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought"—the reconstruction of German deeds in the form of German political philosophy and political pedagogy. We may get at the truth central to our immediate needs, though only a fraction of the whole truth, if we disregard all the ramifications of this philosophy and confine ourselves to three of its taproots.

In the first place, early in the nineteenth century, while dread of Napoleonism still dogged German minds, Hegel, the most abstract of all German philosophers, crystallized a conception which had been in flux in German thought for many generations, and made it the keystone of his political system: "The State is reason at its highest power."

In spite of the limitation just prescribed, there is strong temptation to widen the discussion into a display of how Kant's noble though critically unconvincing ethical system, with its impressive emphasis upon "the oughtness of the ought," interplayed with the Hegelian idea in forming German minds. The reason, in brief, why the Germans of this generation are not to be

explained by Kant is that they now retain only a mechanical pantomime of his veneration for moral authority, while they have forgotten the essential content of his ethics—respect for persons as ends.

If Hegel meant that his dictum veraciously summarizes historical fact, it would be a weakling candidate for the Doctor's degree in history who could not make out a good case for the contradictory thesis: "As we have had it thus far in human experimentation, the state is unreason at its highest power." No matter. This Hegelian dogma has not been uncontested in Germany, of course, but it has steadily acted as a magnet upon philosophical and unphilosophical Germans alike, and it has attracted them into arrangement around itself as a focus.

If, on the other hand, Hegel meant that when reason displays itself at its highest power and when the state reaches its highest development the two will coincide, the dictum is an unscientific impertinence. Who knows? It is at least conceivable, it begins to affect increasing numbers as probable, that reason, when it is finished, will have brought forth internationalism. In this conceivable internationalism, whatever else may be true of it, the state, as we have it thus far, may be reduced to a merely subaltern rank. At all events, the Hegelian doctrine: "The State is reason at its highest power," turns out to be, not a logical absolute, but merely a precarious opinion.

Yet an acquaintance far short of exhaustive with German publicistic literature since 1812 might assemble ample evidence that this Hegelian conception has been a cardinal factor in molding the present dominant type of German thinking—this, both directly and by diffusion. In particular, it has served to create a spiritual soil in which has flourished the second taproot of German political theory—I hope the confusion of metaphors will not obscure the facts—namely, the increasing concurrence of the formers of public opinion in Germany since 1871 in propaganda of the faith which might as well have been officially codified in this form: *The Prussianized State of the Germans is reason at its highest power.* I have rejected the word "connivance," which volunteered for service in the last sentence, and have conscripted "concurrence" in its place.

At this point I am referring not to the whole self-hypnotizing policy which has been in operation among the Germans for two centuries, and which I have referred to as deliberate. My reference now is to a portion of the involved process which has played its part in recent years. In what ratio the actual agents of the school-mastering, first of Prussia, then of Germany, and, finally, in some measure even of the German portions of Austria, have been carrying out a deliberate program of glorifying Prussia and the Prussianized Empire may never be known. I venture the prediction, however, that some time there will come a school of American historians who will reconsider the records of German leading opinion between 1871 and 1914, and will find in them astonishing resemblances to the political callowness which marked the professions of American political leaders of both parties during that stage of our development indexed by the phrase, "the worship of the Constitution." While it is impossible to make out the proportion in which this public pedagogy was official, or semiofficial, or in any way perfunctory, and in what proportion it was spontaneous, our present concern is chiefly with results. As I intimated earlier, the sooner Americans understand that the Germans believe in their form of government with an intensity that may never have been equaled in a great state, the sooner shall we be able to emerge from the rest of our visionary attitude toward the whole crisis. If limits permitted, evidence in any desired quantity might be exhibited in support of my previous hint that this admiration of the Prussianized system extends, with nonessential reservations, even to the great body of the Social Democrats. Their support of the war is sufficient corroboration for our present purposes. It would be still easier to show that since 1871 the German groups which the majority of Americans would classify as the most reliably progressive have been consistent and impassioned in proclaiming their belief that one of the indispensable conditions of continued German progress must ever be the strengthening of the foundations of the Hohenzollern monarchy. One might begin with Gustav Schmoller of Berlin, whose name probably commands the respect of a larger circle of American students of the social sciences than that of any other living German;

and one might continue through the membership of the *Verein für Socialpolitik*, unquestionably since 1874 the most influential extra-governmental body of social theorists in the world. No matter how radical the measures advocated by these men, either as individuals or as a group, the weight of their influence has always counted toward increase of the prestige of the Prussian monarchy. More than this, whatever jealousy of Prussia and the Prussians survives in the lesser German states—speaking always in terms of the situation as it was before the war made inferences about later developments unreliable—it is as grotesque for Americans to suppose that non-Prussian Germany wants to undo the fusing process completed in 1871 as it was for certain Germans a few years ago to speculate that, if our government were drawn into a foreign war, our southern states would make it the psychological moment for another secession!

All in all, among the Germans since 1871 these two elements have been growing more evident, as attitude if not as explicit creed—first, conscious or unconscious deference toward the Hegelian superstition: “The State is reason at its highest power,” secondly, inclination to accept the Prussianized Empire as the only extant specimen of that state which is reason at its highest power.

But with these two cardinal positions in the German reaction we have not yet brought to light the third and decisive factor on the mental side of German influence in the world-crisis. That factor turns out to be merely the German militarists’ version of naïve savagery which began to function uncounted ages before people were capable of political thought at all—when they frankly did whatever their brutish strength permitted. It is the attitude, merely varying in detail, of the ancient military chieftains, of the later Caesars, and of the more subtle mediaeval benevolent despots.

All through the ages two contradictory conceptions of national life have urged for expression and for mastery. The more elemental of these tendencies has held its ground in more or less disguised form most of the time, in most of the world, down to the present moment. However concrete the visible symbols in which this tendency has been embodied, from the single chief, who got or kept his prestige by superior prowess with his club, down to the

latest autocracy of *Kultur*, all the cases of this type of which we have been able to find out very much have buttressed themselves upon the notion, implicit or explicit, that the state is a mysterious, impersonal, superior something, predestined to dominate over the people, and to make the people mere counters in its game. In its more evolved and plausible forms, this theory of the state has always enlisted the devilishly resourceful cunning of a few in getting this mystically impersonal conception of the state identified with themselves. As we look back upon it now, or as we look around, wherever in the world this view still holds, and if we poke underneath its disguises and find what the reality is that remains, it is evident that this supernaturalistic supposition, the "State," has usually been in actuality a very concrete, and self-conscious, and self-asserting person, or bunch of persons, masquerading as the "State" and compelling or cajoling the masses of the people into pulling their chestnuts out of the fire, instead of leading that kind of co-operation which would make most for the general good. Historically, with few exceptions, the actual state has been some tyrant, some oriental despot, some man on horseback, some commercial oligarchy, as in Venice under the Doges, some military caste, as in Germany today. In each case, with qualifications few or many, weak or strong, in numberless varieties, the aims of a usurping faction, rather than the general welfare, have controlled the destinies of the whole. Tradition has put in the mouth of Louis XIV the symbolic words: "The State? I am the State!" Whether the "Great Monarch" ever uttered the formula or not, the sentiment is the breath of life of the actual ruler or rulers in every state still controlled by any subspecies whatsoever of the primitive paganism of force.

The German military caste has enthroned the same old paganism, but it has furnished it with the frankest creed it has ever confessed since the earliest naïve creeds of deeds began to "clothe their naked shame" with creeds of words. The national obsession of the Germans has betrayed itself at its ghastliest in the most fanatical surrender to this pagan creed that has been exhibited on a large scale since the most sanguinary period of Islam. Bernhardi and Treitschke have been merely the best advertised among the

countless acolytes of this archaeological paganism in its German revival: "The State is power!" *Der Staat ist Macht!*

Now, as I have just pointed out, this creed of the resuscitated paganism to which the Germans have become unresisting perverts accurately indicates the character of a majority of the states that have actually occurred thus far in the moral evolution of society. As a mere matter of logic, however, the psychosis through which this generalization of fact has become domiciled in the minds of the Germans as the supreme imperative of their national religion is a case of one of the most elementary fallacies. It is as though one should reason: *Man is an animal; therefore, the supreme privilege and duty of man is to imitate the beasts of prey.* Ever since Aristotle it has been a part of the world's common sense that the whole story about anything is told, not by its beginnings, but by its beginnings plus its completions.

Simple as is the logical refutation of the German creed of power, the ethical refutation is still more decisive. Both in its academic expositions and in its applications in the conduct of the German government toward other governments and peoples, the creed, "*The State is power,*" turns out to be insolent denial of every ancient or modern ethical or religious faith which has followed instinct or vision of the evolving sovereignty of the spirit. "*The State is power*" turns out to mean: If a weaker people possess anything that the rulers of a stronger people want, those rulers of the stronger people need only plead "military necessity," and no law of man or God may stay any hideous use of force which might enable the stronger to work their will. For three years the Germans have been proving their faith by works of ruthlessness more ferocious than the world has seen since the madness of the Inquisition.

Nevertheless, for the same time, some of the best men and women in America have done what they could to make a mistaken conception of righteousness embarrass the vindication of righteousness. They have talked of "compromise" or something equally inconceivable. Between morality and physical power there can be no more compromise than between assertion and denial of the multiplication table. One must rule. The other must submit.

Let me interject the explanation that by "morality" I do not mean my code of conduct, nor yours; not a set of rules which Americans or Englishmen might desire to impose upon other peoples. By "morality" I mean, now, simply that irreducible minimum for the security of which we must fight to a finish against the Germans, namely, *the principle that whenever their enterprises visibly affect the interests of other men or other nations, civilized men, whether individuals or groups, are bound to prefer legal and rational to violent means of promoting their interests.*

Our national folklore has joined the name of an American naval officer, whose loyalty was less dubious than his ethics, with the unfortunate attempt at a patriotic aphorism: "My Country! In her intercourse with foreign nations may she ever be right, but, right or wrong, my country!" In their zeal for a more defensible patriotism honest pacifists have gone to the other extreme with a doctrine which practically means: Our country can never be right if, in the name of all its moral and physical force, it halts another nation that is violently wrong with the ultimatum, "Thus far and no farther."

At this moment the German cause reduces to the desperation of those militarists to vindicate themselves who for years have advertised the shameless creed that morality has no rights against the power of the state. For no one knows precisely how many years the German government has been a conspiracy to disfranchise morality in the conduct of nation toward nation, and to establish the military power of Germany in its place. So soon as we Americans take in this ugly fact, those of us with the rudiments of a conscience must realize that, until the Germans repudiate this military caste and the creed it imposes, to be at peace with Germany would make our nation a moral monstrosity.

In practice, the German system works out in two aspects which to outward appearance are contradictory. Whether at bottom they are contradictory or complementary is a question too involved for profitable discussion here. Let us glance at each aspect in certain of its distinctive manifestations.

We may refer to these two obvious aspects of the German system as the *domestic* and the *foreign*, or the *national* and the

international. Not only Americans, but Germans themselves, have been queered in their judgment of the German government by the fact that one and the same system presents appearances so contradictory that they cannot be reconciled. Both Germans and Americans have reasoned, in effect: "The domestic aspect of the German system reaches such benign results that the alleged badness of the German foreign policy cannot be real." It is one of the humors of our immature intellectuality that the most sophisticated of us still hunt for mental and moral consistency behind human actions!

For brevity let us call upon parable to picture the quality of the German domestic system.

My attention was first called to the town of Pullman by descriptions of it as a "model community." It was alleged that everything which intelligent benevolence could devise had been done to furnish the employees in the Pullman works with all the living conditions necessary for their comfort and happiness. Not long after, my lot was cast in such a way that only half an hour separated my home from Pullman. Very soon there were labor disturbances at Pullman, and, with others, I was called upon to investigate. I found that the descriptions which I had read of the physical equipment of the town had not been too highly colored. At the same time, I found the most discontented and bitter inhabitants that I had ever met. The burden of their complaints was not expressed in terms of wages, nor labor hours, nor any other physical standards of living. The worst-felt grievance seemed to be voiced in the assertion that they were treated like children, not like men and women. The most telltale bit of evidence that I discovered was the current sneer: "We are born in a Pullman house, cradled in a Pullman crib, fed from a Pullman store, taught in a Pullman school, confirmed in a Pullman church, exploited in a Pullman shop, and when we die we'll be buried in a Pullman grave and go to a Pullman hell."

It would be contrary to the evidence to doubt that, in motive, George M. Pullman was a conscientious philanthropist. His mistake was in principle that of all the genuinely benevolent despots. He confounded philanthropy with patronage. He had not found out that the best way for men to help men is not to do things for

them, but to do things with them, and perhaps better still to remove removable hindrances to their doing things for themselves.

When I became a citizen of Waterville, in 1881, and wished to walk abroad of a night when the moon was not in session, I always carried a lantern. There was not a street light in town. Neither was there a street car, nor a water-main, nor a sewer. Not a lawnmower had ever been in commission. The yards looked like pastures that had strayed in from the farms. The two most sightly spots for the landscape gardener in the center of the town were dumping places for débris. There was not a public school-house which any of the prosperous citizens would have consented to use as a stable, and a little later I built the second, possibly the third, house in the town that contained a bathroom.

As I have looked about in Waterville at intervals during the past forty-eight hours, it has seemed to me that some mightier Aladdin had meanwhile been conjuring. I can see room for improvement still. You cannot control the rain, for instance, but some day you will control the mud. And many other kinds of progress will doubtless mark the next thirty years. As it is, the contrast between Waterville as I first knew it and the Waterville of today is the outward sign of a generation's advance in civilization. And you have done it yourselves! It has not been handed down to you from above! You would not have taken it as a gift; you would even go back a generation and do it all over again, if the alternative were to accept it out of hand, even from the most masterful of the public-spirited men who have lived among you in the course of these years. Rather than be policed in every detail of life outside of your domicile, and in many details within it, by the most magnanimous human beings you have ever known, you would elect a return to primitive conditions, and to the adventure of working out that salvation of personality which can be achieved only in the exercise of responsible self-direction.

In miniature, the contrast between the town of Pullman and the town of Waterville reflects the difference between German and American civic conditions, with the single difference that the Germans are proud of their kind and despise ours, while we hold to our kind and abhor theirs.

Now, the case is by no means as one-sided as either people think. If the worthy way through life for a moral being were a greater Cook's personally conducted tour, our American method would be a hopeless competitor with the German. In sheer bodily comfort and security and in certain guaranties of spiritual liberty, regardless of possible not completely stifled scruples about abdication of one's selfhood, the average German during the past generation has undoubtedly got more for what he paid than the average American. But there's the rub! The unreckoned part of the price which the Germans pay is their aborted personality. Von Buelow knew his Germans when he said, in his volume *Imperial Germany*, published not long before the war, that the Germans are not political beings, that they are incapable of parliamentary government. I began to find that out in my first contacts with Germans in 1879. As a deliberate experiment, I have many times, then and since, led conversations with casual acquaintances up to some political subject. Almost invariably, unless I happened to have met a member of the political class, although there had been no hesitation about expression of opinion upon all previous topics, the stereotyped answer would be: "O! That's a matter for the government!" We may not boast that the output of average individual American opinion upon political questions is impressive; but this is impressive, namely, the consciousness of every American that it is a part of his personality to exert his own unrestricted share in creating political standards and in shaping political policies.

As long as I live, I shall not cease to grieve that these two conceptions of what is best in civic life could not have worked side by side to their limit in peace. It may well be that there is more in each of these conceptions than those who can see good in only one of them are able to understand. It may be that civilization might have been served best in the long run if these two types of civic experiment could have developed in parallel columns, until the advantages and the disadvantages of each had demonstrated themselves to both.

However that may be, Americans have always reckoned liberty of political self-expression and self-realization among the choicest of human goods; while since 1848 the Germans

have made no formidable demand for individual self-expression in politics. Nearly twenty-five years ago Pastor Frommel, who had been frozen out of his position as Court Preacher at Berlin because of his pernicious sympathy with the wage-earning classes, told me that, when he began to get into personal touch with factory operatives, he was astonished at the nature of their demands. He said that regularly, in reply to his question, "What do you want?" the answer, from men and women alike, would be, "We want recognition" (*Wir wünschen Anerkennung*). Which, being interpreted, meant that they wanted to be met by their employers on the level of human beings and to be accorded the rights of human beings in representing their own interests. Up to the present moment there has been in Germany neither an effective concerted movement to gain similar recognition in politics, nor evidence that there is enough latent demand for such recognition among the Germans to make such a movement respectable.

Worse than this, domineering militarism has kept civil life in Germany in a cowering menial attitude toward the army, and it has put official premiums upon an overbearing attitude of the army toward civilians.

One morning, ten or fifteen years ago, I happened to be in Potsdam when the order of the day included presentation of the colors to a regiment of new troops. The guard of honor was drawn up on one side of a square of which a church formed the second side, the spectators the third, while the fourth side was to be occupied by the approaching regiment. The Kaiser had returned that day from a vacation, and in the corner by the church he was chatting with members of his staff. I was near enough to see every detail in pantomime, without hearing a word. The Kaiser had said something flattering to a big handsome officer, who stood in his bravery of gala uniform and decorations preening himself after the Kaiser had passed on to the next in line. Just then a little girl of perhaps five or six years appeared through a narrow archway in the wall near the church. She looked searchingly in every direction, then stretched her hand above her head, and I saw that she had been sent to post a letter in a box behind the tall officer. It was too high. The little girl raised herself on tiptoes, but could

not reach the opening. She turned and stood irresolute for a moment, her disappointed, bewildered look perfectly legible from my point of observation. Then she took notice of the big strong man, and her face lighted up with a glad smile at the instinctive feeling that he was the solution of her difficulty. She lifted the letter toward him. He took it mechanically, with one or two glances back and forth between it and her. His intellect was evidently less brilliant than his uniform. Presently the idea took shape in his brain that this slip of a girl had called on him for help. With an arrogant toss of his head and a contemptuous snap of his wrist, he threw the letter to the ground.

Volumes might be written on German militarism without telling more about its essential spirit than this incident revealed. It was merely a mannerism, too matter-of-course to be questioned by Germans, of the same civilization which struck medals in commemoration of the murder of women and children on the Lusitania. I repeat that, whatever the other excellencies of the Germans, a national sentiment which tolerates an army with that spirit toward the people is demonstration of pitifully aborted personality.

But it is in the other aspect, in its attitude toward other nations, that the soulless paganism which the Germans have accepted from their militarists as the national religion most immediately appears. Again I forbear generalities and testify from my own experience.

In the summer of 1903 I was in Germany on business which gave me occasion to sample the opinions about our country of more different classes of Germans than I had ever interviewed before. The itinerary scheduled stops at Cologne, Lucerne, Vienna, Budapest, Munich, Dresden, Berlin, and thence an excursion into Russia. At each of these points, and in the intermediate travel, I had opportunities to talk with many men of prominence and with as many more whom I could classify merely as ordinary specimens of their various types. I soon became aware that, quite aside from the direct purpose of my trip, I was gathering from these sources a collection of significant and cumulative evidence. Over and over again Germans of different social positions, living in as many different parts of Germany and neighboring countries, volunteered the same opinion in almost the same words: "You Yankees are all

right, but it is only a question of time when we Germans will have to fight you, not with trade regulations, but with cannon." And my question "Why?" invariably brought the stereotyped answer: "Because you are trying to get some of the world's foreign commerce."

Up to that time I had firmly believed in the pacific intentions of Germany. I had regarded the pan-German agitation as a joke. I had interpreted the familiar grandiose utterances of Kaiser, and professor, and editor, and Reichstag orator as the harmless word-painting of an imaginative people who delight in setting national commonplaces in a heroic light. But these coincidences started my reflections in a new direction. It was incredible that so many men, of such different kinds, from such widely separated places, could have arrived independently at such an astonishing consensus. Such a state of mind must have been the result of some central influence or influences. A captain of infantry, whom I met in the home of a friend in Berlin, strengthened this inference when he gave me a book which contained the same sentiment in almost the same words, with the comment which afterward proved to carry accrued interest: "It is the most popular book of the year among German officers." Then I began to pick up other threads of association. I recalled a lecture which I had heard during my student days by Professor Gneist, of Berlin, who at the time was reputed to be the foremost continental expositor of the British constitution. The argument expanded these propositions: "The United States of America has no sovereign. Therefore it has no sovereignty. Therefore it is not in the proper sense of the term a state. Therefore it is not entitled to the full rights of a state among states." I had listened with amusement to the exposition and had scarcely thought of it meanwhile, because I had taken it as a choice specimen of academic pedantry, with no practical bearing. Presently I began to recall, however, that in my reading since my student days I had come across many German expressions of the same idea, with the implication that it was something to be taken for granted.

On my return to Chicago, I reported my experience in a newspaper interview, with the conclusion that we Americans would be living in a fool's paradise until we provided ourselves with a

navy so strong that, even if the creed which I had heard should proselyte all Germany, it would be too unsafe to follow it into practice. For two or three weeks following publication of the interview, at a signal from Consul Wever, of Chicago—one of the most efficient promoters of German interests that has ever represented that country in the United States—the German-language press of America and not a few publications in English bristled with abuse of the ignorant American tourist who had insulted Germany by drawing such an inference from such data.

Up to the present hour the Germans have pursued the same policy of denying the significance of any and every fact which tended to fix on them the stigma of militarism in general or responsibility for the present war in particular. No matter what German has indorsed the creed of force, or of terrorization as the technique of the creed, even the Kaiser, or the Crown Prince, or the chancellor, or authors with readers by the hundred thousands, the professional German apologists have always given the cue for a world-wide claque to shout the repudiation: "That particular utterance, or that particular man, cuts no figure in Germany."

We have always had a few men in American politics who waxed great in their own eyes by declamation of the manifest destiny of the United States to be "bounded on the north by the Aurora Borealis, on the south by the Southern Cross." Usually the saving sense of the people, ably aided and abetted by the obduracy of things, has rendered such politicians innocuous. But suppose the inconceivable had become actual, and we had found ourselves under an administration which had deliberately committed this country to the aim of annexing Canada. Suppose we had made it a test of loyalty to support this administration in waging a war for the conquest of the Dominion. Suppose we had persisted in accepting without question the administration's fiction—"The war was forced upon us!" Suppose we had refused to cast in our lot with any peace movement which might involve overthrow of the administration or of the party that had seduced the country into its immoral course. In that case our deeds would have spoken louder than our words. American character would consequently have to be known, not by what Americans had denied in terms, but by what we had actually done.

The outstanding fact, to which the Germans have been delivering themselves with accelerated motion till the incredible culmination of 1914, and since, is that all the Germans have adopted as their own the cause of those leaders who have advertised their trust in war as the foremost means of satisfying national ambitions.

I have said that all through the ages two contradictory conceptions of national life have urged for expression and mastery. We have been reviewing the form in which the one conception has taken its latest shape in German word and deed. Time remains for only the briefest allusion to the alternative tendency. A part of the next great constructive task of mankind is to give distinctness and reality to the opposite conception.

In spite of those ancient states to which history has given the name "republic," it is not certain that the antithesis of the present dominating German idea of the state ever began to be articulate in the voice of a great public until more confident than convincing expressions of it were heard in the American and the French revolutions. Today we are trying to symbolize the whole truth by the slogan: "Democracy against Autocracy!" While that watchword may be suggestive enough for rallying purposes, a nation which accepted that antithesis as either precise or exhaustive would soon resolve itself into a wholesale case of the blind leading the blind. We have the task of finding the crystal truth in contradiction of the turgid lie: "The State is power."

I venture the opinion that we shall never separate the truth from vitiating error until we have broken utterly with all our traditional doctrines of the state in terms of that plausible philosophical conception, "sovereignty." The real truth, and the whole truth, will be found only after we have taken our departure from the homely fact that a state is essentially like any other human group—a bridge club, a philharmonic society, a merchandizing firm, a banking corporation, a charity organization, a religious community, a counterfeiters' gang, an artists' guild—*a state is a company of persons behaving themselves in a certain way*. Whatever distance in comprehension or in character may separate a group which we call a state from each and every other type of human group, a state continues its identity with each and every other human group, at least in this: it is composed of human

beings, with all the moral liabilities of human beings. By forming themselves into, or by finding themselves in, any sort of grouping whatsoever, human beings cannot release themselves from the universal obligation of human beings to respect the humanity of one another. They cannot exempt themselves from a jot or a tittle of one of the laws of physical or mental or moral cause and effect, which are bound to assert themselves sooner or later as the inexorable conditions of the human lot.

The central, supreme, paramount issue of this war is whether civilization is to instal the principle of aggression as its highest law; whether for a defiant epoch morality is to be suspended; whether, during an era of the most cynical apostasy that the record of mankind will have registered, that nation is to be greatest which can mobilize the most terrific force and use it in the most savage way.

In his zeal to reassure the American people and to convince all other peoples that the United States does not want anybody's goods, or chattels, or lands, or anything that is our neighbors', President Wilson unintentionally left it possible for the stupid and the designing to assert that Americans are fighting for nothing.

On the contrary, as the President's later utterances up to the message of January 8, 1917, have consistently explained, those Americans who are morally awake are fighting for everything above the mercenary level that makes life worth the living. We are fighting for the decision that henceforth this world shall be a place in which physical power shall be, not the standard of right, but the servant of right. No other generation in history has had an equal opportunity to promote the moral achievements of mankind. The remaining catastrophe most to be feared is not that more thousands of lives may have to be offered upon the altar of this century's high decision. If coming generations could look down upon us, their anxiety would be, first and chiepest, lest we should stay our hands before we had secured the primacy of morals in the affairs of nations.

No state since the days of the Decalogue has committed itself to a loftier political ideal than that which our country professes. Citizenship of the United States involves loyalty or treason to that ideal. Coined into terms of today, that ideal requires that progres-

sive sense of justice shall enact the laws; and that law shall control force, not force the law, both in domestic and in foreign relations. No other people ever received so rich an endowment of physical resources as we have inherited. Are we to squander that endowment upon our physical and moral softnesses, or shall we use it to support the prodigious moral experiment to which we are committed? The world being what it is, Americans of this generation can neither improve nor retain their birthright unless they are resolved to continue instalment payments of the same price of suffering with which our fathers bought our birthright.

Few native Americans have more or weightier reasons for gratitude to Germany than I have been accumulating for nearly forty years. None can be more willing in every possible way to acknowledge the debt which can never be discharged. And yet! And yet! This will be an intolerable world until the Germans have once and forever recanted, with all it involves, that most hellish heresy that has ever menaced civilization: **THERE IS NO GOD BUT POWER, AND PRUSSIA IS ITS PROPHET!**

The Germans are still so unsuspecting of their rulers that they do not want to be disillusioned. President Wilson never uttered more literal truth than when he told us that in fighting with the Germans we shall prove in the end to have been fighting for the Germans as well as for ourselves, just as our fight with the English in '76 proved to be a fight, not for our own liberty alone, but for the enfranchisement of every subject of the British crown.

With the most cordial hopes that in the days to come the Germans may enjoy all the prosperity of every sort which they can win on their merits, without violating the equal rights of any other people, we should be numbered among the betrayers of mankind if we did not now exert our utmost physical and spiritual strength to convince the Germans that their Baal is asleep, never more to wake, or on a journey, never again to return.

Now is our nation's Gethsemane. In the beginnings of our agony and bloody sweat we are still praying, "If it be possible, let this cup pass from me!" God grant that the generations to come may forever cherish the memory of the cross which we shall bear, as the symbol of their redemption unto spiritualized political life!

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DEMOCRACY THE BASIS FOR WORLD-ORDER

By

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CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

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Published February 1918

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

THE BAKER & TAYLOR COMPANY
NEW YORK

THE J. K. GILL COMPANY
PORTLAND, OREGON

THE CUNNINGHAM, CURTISS & WELCH COMPANY
LOS ANGELES

THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON AND EDINBURGH

THE MARUZEN-KABUSHIKI-KAISHA
TOKYO, OSAKA, KYOTO, FUKUOKA, SENDAI

THE MISSION BOOK COMPANY
SHANGHAI

DEMOCRACY THE BASIS FOR WORLD-ORDER

The United States is a pacifist nation—I believe and hope an incurably pacifist nation. Our entrance into this war, reluctant as it was, and hesitant as for a time it continued, will be increasingly realized, I think, as a measure, not of our departure from, but of our devotion to, the cause of peace. We dislike all wars; we incline to distrust even our own; and I, at least, believe that the slowness with which the national fervor has been rising to this war is a not unencouraging evidence that we insist upon being definitely persuaded that this is no sordid war in which the common treasure and common lives are being spent in the service of nationalistic rivalries of dynasties or business or investments. You remember the passionate denial of our Chicago poet in 1898, when doubts of the same sort forced themselves on his mind:

Lies! lies!
It cannot be! The wars we wage
Are noble, and our battles still are won
By justice for us ere we lift the gage.
We have not sold our loftiest heritage!
The proud republic hath not stooped to cheat
And scramble in the market place of war.
Her forehead weareth yet its solemn star!

We do well, therefore, not to be impatient of popular scruples upon our entrance into war, but to be proud of them, and to regard the present task of leadership, not as the autocratic one of imposing this war upon a reluctant mass, but as the democratic one of winning their hearty support by demonstrating its worthiness. There may be some irony in the nature of some of the conspicuous leadership in our various war councils; but we may surely feel confident that sooner or later democracy will take effective charge of its own war, and hold it to its purpose.

Blindness we may forgive,
But baseness we will smite.

And especially, since we have decided upon the method of conscription for our armies, we owe it doubly to the young men whom we take, and to their fathers and mothers, to make it certain beyond the

shadow of a doubt that no unworthy uses at home or abroad shall be allowed to tarnish their New World victories.

What then is our purpose? It is expressed in the topic I have taken for my discussion in this series as the cause of democracy as the essential basis of a world-order. That was the principal theme of the last half of the President's war address to Congress; subsequent events and discussion have increased its significance. I want to try to indicate in what sense it is true that Germany stands as the chief enemy of democracy; how it is impossible for her, so long as that enmity lasts, to be a good neighbor in the world, and how that is the chief obstacle to our American hope for peace and world-order.

The first task, then, is the unpleasant one of proving an indictment, not against a nation, but against a state—for I think it would be well for us to confess with Edmund Burke that we do not know how to indict a nation. And may I say parenthetically that I suppose that it is still possible to hate wrong without hating the wrongdoer, and that if we seem to claim virtue for ourselves and impute sin to the Germans, it behooves us to remember that it is largely sheer good luck that has enabled us to be right, and bitter, blinding pressure that has made Germany wrong. If Prussia is today trying to construct Mittel-Europa, it is largely Mittel-Europa that has made Prussia what she is.

Well, then, what do we mean when we say that Germany stands for autocracy against the democracies of the world? We do not mean anything so shallow as that her institutions of government are badly planned and should be amended. I suppose that may be said of the United States without treason, even in war time; and if this were a war to force Germany to adopt the United States Constitution, several of us might feel strongly inclined to be conscientious objectors. Such institutions are rather the manifestations and symptoms of something more fundamental—of an attitude toward life and of settled principles of public conduct. Democracy is not a set of devices, a form of machinery of suffrage, of representation, of elections, of relations of executive and legislature, and the like, though they may all have something to do with it. It is not a thing to be enacted, not a goal to be attained and enjoyed. If it were that, and if we had attained it, why then the sooner we found something more important to talk about the better. No! Democracy is a method of progress. It is a faith—unproved like other faiths, but with heartening gleams of promise—a faith in a common humanity; a belief that men are essentially the same kind of stuff; that in this long pilgrimage of history all travel a common road, and that only by the

co-operation of all, by the recognition of all as common partners in the enterprise, with the common dignity of membership, the common experience of failure and achievement, can any sound and permanent advance, any progress worth the fighting for, be attained. It denies then that there can be any such thing as a governing class. To attempt to set aside any such class is in the first place an intolerable waste of human spiritual resources; and in the second place it thwarts the hope of civilization. The progress of organized society is the progress of justice between men, and the fruitful ideas of social justice are not handed down from above, but forced up from below. Democracy holds that only by raising a whole people to higher levels can any part of that nation ultimately prosper, and that only as participating and co-operating members can the whole people be raised. It stands for the appeal to reason.

And what, by contrast, is autocracy? It is the appeal to authority as such, to prescription, to the method of power. It denies the righteousness and the profit of general co-operation. It believes in the management of many wills by the competent few. Where democracy holds that men are in general such that they will respond to opportunity and turn toward the light, autocracy holds that they must in general be managed for their own good and that of the state by a will that is not their own. Democracy invites the ranging human spirit to experiment with life. Autocracy proposes to order and regiment it. Democracy respects intrinsic human life with a respect touched with humility; autocracy distrusts and suppresses it.

Germany in its organized capacity stands for autocracy. This is not the time to discuss in detail German imperial institutions. They have been much discussed during this war, both intelligently and unintelligently. A Reichstag based, it is true, on universal suffrage, but in a positive sense endowed with little power and elected from districts none of which have been changed since 1870, and most of them not since 1867, in spite of the fact that the movement of population has been greater and more politically significant in the Germany of the last generation and a half than almost anywhere else in the world; districts which the government refuses to reform because as they stand they grossly over-represent the backward-looking reactionary elements and under-represent the democratic, forward-looking elements; a council of German executives set over it, made up of representatives appointed by and responsible to the monarchs of the states; all under the presidency of a Kaiser who does not know how, if indeed it could be done, to distinguish between his Prussian kingship by divine right and his imperial presidency by

constitutional enactment. That sort of utterance which was described in the Reichstag at the time of the famous *Daily Telegraph* interview in 1907 as "the impulsive manifestations, the effervescences, the explosions of monarchical subjectivism" is apparently made without distinction between Prussian and imperial authority. "That which was lacking in the old Hansa," said the Emperor in the nineties, "a strong united empire obedient to one will, we now have, thanks to the grace of heaven and the deeds of my grandfather. Only one is master in the Empire and I am that one—I tolerate no other." And the Junkers join in maintaining the confusion. "The king of Prussia or the German emperor," said von Oldenburg-Januschau in the Bundesrat on January 29, 1910, "must always be in a position to say to any lieutenant: 'Take ten men and close the Reichstag.'"

It would be a mistake of serious consequence, however, to believe that the essence of German autocracy was spread evenly throughout the Empire. Its source and its home are Berlin and the dominance of Prussia. Prussia has since 1870 commanded the Empire, and the more artistic, easy-going, and amiable parts have yielded an implicit obedience to the strenuous discipline of the drill-sergeant of the Elbe. It is necessary to remind ourselves that Prussia is in population and area more than three-fifths of all Germany; that her king is *ipso facto* German emperor; that by special arrangement he commands effectively the entire military power of the Empire; that Prussia has an absolute veto upon any constitutional change, as well as upon any change in the laws governing the army and navy. In spite of some evidence of occasional irritation, the right of Prussia to dictate the character of the new Empire has not been seriously questioned. And it is not strange that this is so. No German can forget how the long-deferred hopes of the idealists and liberals came to apparent wreck in 1848 and the prospect of a Germany united under democratic auspices seemed permanently defeated with the refusal of the Prussian king to accept an imperial crown by the gift of the people; nor how the strong and ruthless hand of Bismarck took charge of the forces of German nationality, beat down liberal opposition, re-created the Prussian army, and through three planned and "willed" wars forged the German Empire. Nor can any German forget how in the short space of ten years, under Prussian militarist leadership, the German name rose in the world from a position of political insignificance if not ridicule to a practical primacy in Europe, signalized by the meeting in Berlin of a Congress of Powers under the presidency of Bismarck himself to settle that very Eastern question out of which this present

war took its origin. In the eyes of patriotic Germans Prussia earned its leadership; but liberal Germany has paid the cost in its submission to the arrogant and overbearing Prussian autocracy—an autocracy hardened against the voices of reform by the intoxication of success. Movements toward democracy in the rest of Germany have either made their way against Prussian opposition, as in Bavaria, or have been killed by the Prussian veto, as in the Mecklenburgs.

For the Prussian malady, in political terms, is the “monarchical principle”; and Prussia resents as a threat to her position and prestige any impairment in Germany (and even, as we have recently been enabled to see, in Russia) of the doctrine of royal power. “All that the Emperor gains,” said Yorck von Wartenburg in the Prussian House of Lords in January, 1914, “is a loss for the King of Prussia. Now Prussia represents in Germany the monarchical principle.” What then is this monarchical principle? It is the doctrine of the hereditary executive, not as a form within which the popular will operates, as in Great Britain, Italy, Spain, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, but as an active and dominant power. It is monarchy by divine right. The monarch is not within the constitution, as in truly constitutional states, but outside of it and above it; not an organ of the constitution, but anterior to it. What political institutions exist have their being by the king’s grace. He consults for his own guidance and information, but not for the control of his judgment, a legislature one house of which is in the absolute control of the hopelessly reactionary Junkers, who are more royalist than the king, and the other based upon a travesty of popular suffrage which practically excludes the mass of the people from all representation, and which Bismarck himself denounced as the most senseless and miserable in the world. The king, say all the commentators, is responsible to God and his conscience, and to nobody and nothing else. In Great Britain and other liberal monarchies the maxim that the king can do no wrong has long since yielded the practical corollary that, since any human being may do wrong if he does anything, the king must be constitutionally prevented from doing personally any act whatsoever that can have any political significance. Not so in Prussia. There the doctrine still holds that what an active king does is politically unchallengeable—a doctrine that disappeared in Great Britain with the Stuarts in 1688, and in France with the Bourbons in 1830. It is of some interest to remark that the last body of systematic glorification of monarchical absolutism which can be compared with the chorus of the Prussian professors since about 1870 is that which accompanied from

1814 to 1830 those restored Bourbons of whom it was said that they forgot nothing and learned nothing. The present King of Prussia has constantly expressed the high monarchical view. "Regarding myself as an instrument of the Lord," he said on one occasion, "I go my way, whose goal is the welfare and peaceable development of our fatherland, and in so doing I am indifferent to the views and opinions of the day." And on another occasion: "Those who will work with me I welcome; those who oppose me I will smash." With the gift of a statue of the Great Elector to the city of Bielefeld he wrote that it was sent as a permanent sign that "as in this ancestor, so in me, there is an inflexible will to go forward in the way once deemed right, in spite of all resistance." In 1890, addressing an academic audience, he said: "Gentlemen, my ancestors, feeling the pulse of the time, have always discerned coming events. Then they have placed themselves at the head of the new movements, resolved to direct them and lead them to new ends. Similarly I think that I, too, have recognized whither the new spirit and the century nearing its end are tending."

We might well dismiss such utterances as the vagaries of a somewhat unbalanced mind if it were not for two facts. In the first place the lack of balance is not personal merely, but institutional; no man can be a Prussian king and be wholly sane; a measure of insanity is a prerequisite to any full occupancy of the office. And in the second place a potentate who so conceives his office and hears it always so described by others is pretty sure to be the unwitting instrument of more matter-of-fact minds and more realistic forces, which avoid public scrutiny by thrusting him forward. The real political struggle in an absolutism goes on in the shadow behind the throne.

Let me refer finally, for illustration of the Prussian idea of kingship, to the Kaiser's famous Koenigsberg speech of August, 1910, in which he said that he would take his inspiration from God alone, who had given him his crown, and never from public opinion or the will of assemblies. This utterance raised in the Reichstag a storm of criticism coming from two angles: first, from the non-Prussian members, who resented the apparent transfer of the doctrines of the Prussian monarchy to the Empire; and secondly, from the democratic members, both Prussian and non-Prussian, who attacked its antidemocratic substance. The official defense by Bethmann-Hollweg on November 26, 1910, denied the first and unqualifiedly defended the second. He said:

The Koenigsberg speech which the King of Prussia pronounced to his subjects in a Prussian province ["Very good!" from the Right] does not constitute, as has been

asserted, a proclamation of absolutist views in contravention to the constitution, but a somewhat energetic affirmation of that monarchical principle upon which the Prussian public law rests [“Very good!” from the Right]; an affirmation joined with the expression of profound religious conviction shared by the great mass of the German people. The kings of Prussia are united to their people through a logical evolution of several centuries. That evolution did not take such a course that the people created its kingdom; on the contrary, by a labor almost unexampled in history, it was its great chieftains issuing from the House of Hohenzollern, it was this House which, finding a firm support in the capacity and tenacity of its population, it was this House which forged the Prussian state [“Very good!”]. Upon the basis of this historic evolution the Prussian constitution knows not the conception of popular sovereignty. That is why the kings of Prussia are, so far as their own people are concerned, kings by their own right [“Very good!” from the Right. Laughter from the Left]. Gentlemen, your laughter does not change history. And if, at the present moment, from the democratic side, the pretension is energetically raised that the King of Prussia is to be regarded as a great dignitary established by the people, it is no matter for surprise if the King asserts with the same vigor his will never to submit to any popular sovereignty [“Very good!” from the Right]. The personal irresponsibility of the king, the self-sufficiency, original, autocratic, of the monarchical power, these are the fundamental ideas of the life of the Prussian state, which have remained vital, even through the constitutional period of its historic evolution. They are the ideas which the King of Prussia has asserted in the old city where the kings of Prussia were crowned according to the ancient formula “By the Grace of God.”

With this proclamation, from the mouth of one whom we have learned to regard not as an extremist but as a moderate in Germany, of the doctrine of absolutism, of royal absolution from the common restraints of men, we may turn from the “monarchical principle.”

We must look back of the throne. Behind the monarchical principle stands Prussian militarism and the whole system of caste control knit together by the military cult. It is the misfortune of Prussia that it has so demonstrably prospered in the long history of its upbuilding as a European power by the use of non-moral, if not immoral, force. The faith in arms, in force per se, as an instrument of Providence, through the agency of the Hohenzollerns, for the advancement of Prussia and of Germany, has been drilled in for many generations. It was Mirabeau who said: “War is the national industry of Prussia”; and to him is also attributed the other epigram: “Prussia is not a nation that has an army; it is an army that has a nation.” Reference has been already made to the part played by arms in the unification of Germany under Prussian leadership, and the process was summed up in those words of Bismarck, the towering figure of the new Empire, spoken September 30, 1867: “The great questions of the present are not decided by arguments and the decisions of majorities, but by blood and iron.” These words are

of the currency of thought of Prussian statesmen. Although Maximilian Harden is not always a reliable spokesman of the mind of Prussia, he was unquestionably echoing, not inventing, when he said: "If our jealous enemies force us to it, the *furor teutonicus* will reawaken, and Germany will remember that war has more than once been the most profitable of its industries."

It is of some significance that the present King of Prussia made his first address upon his accession to the throne to his army, and that not until three days later did he address the Prussian people. His speeches to soldiers are full of his insistence upon the priority of the military profession in the life of Prussia, and of his soldiers' complete subjection to the king's will. "Now, as ever, the one pillar on which the Empire rests is the army." "The chief pillars of the army are courage, honor, and unconditional blind obedience." "The soldier has not to have a will of his own; you must indeed all have one will, and that is my will; there is only one law and that is my law." These are random samples from Wilhelm's addresses to soldiers.

Americans will like to contrast with these the words of Abraham Lincoln when he addressed a regiment on its way to the front in 1864:

I always feel inclined when I talk to soldiers to try to impress upon them the importance of success in this contest. . . . I happen temporarily to occupy this White House. I am a living witness that any one of your children may look to come here as my father's child has. It is in order that each one of you may have an open field and a fair chance for your industry, enterprise, and intelligence; that you may all have equal privileges in the race of life with all its desirable human aspirations. It is for this that the struggle should be maintained, not for one year only, but for two or three.

We may congratulate ourselves upon being the inheritors of the tradition of Abraham Lincoln rather than that of the Hohenzollerns.

Two more quotations, neither from a military man, will help to emphasize the position assigned to the military caste in Prussia. Professor Hans Delbrueck, of the University of Berlin, in his *Regierung und Volkswille*, published in the spring of 1914, after declaring that the army stopped at a form of sentiment anterior to the modern notion of patriotism, and that German soldiers serve the king, not the fatherland, goes on: "The king is their comrade, and they are attached to him as to their war leader, and that is the foundation of our national life. The essence of our monarchy lies in its relations with the army. Whoever knows our officers must be convinced that they would not tolerate the government of a minister of war dependent on the Reichstag." And Bethmann-

Hollweg in the Landtag, January 10, 1914, said: "The dearest wish of every Prussian is to see the army of the king remain intact under the management of its king, and not to become an army of Parliament." Whoever recalls the long struggle in England and America to establish the principle of civil control of the military arm will realize the gulf which lies here between Prussia and the Western democracies; and I know of no more instructive contrast than that between the army crisis over Ulster in the spring of 1914 with the debates of the House of Commons upon the resignation of Sir John Seeley as Secretary of State for War, on the one hand, and the Zabern incident and the Reichstag proceedings of December and January, 1913-14, on the other.

The incident of Zabern shed such a sudden illumination upon the Prussian militarist spirit that it deserves a passing notice. In the fall of 1913 the Prussian garrison in this little Alsatian town had got itself into a state of intolerable friction with the townspeople—this, be it remembered, more than forty-two years after the region had passed under the German flag. An officer who was reviewing some cases of discipline came upon that of a soldier charged with stabbing a peasant. "What!" he exclaimed, "Did they fine you for sticking an Alsatian blackguard? I'd have given you ten marks for it, myself," and remitted the sentence. Immediately all the popular resentment flared up, and there were many clashes of varying seriousness. The soldiery proceeded to put down opposition with ruthless severity. Civilians were beaten and imprisoned. A boy was arrested for "intending to laugh" at an officer. Civil authorities, including magistrates, were suspended. The incident which finally commanded the attention of all Germany was the sabering of a lame shoemaker. Democratic and liberal members launched a series of interpellations in the Reichstag, and the arrogance of the Prussian war party received a more complete and general denunciation than it had ever had before. The net result, however, was the turning into hollow mockery of all attempts of the Reichstag to subject the military authorities to any substantially greater restraint; the acquittal of all the officers concerned; the famous telegram of the Crown Prince to the Colonel at Zabern: *Immer feste daran!* ("Keep right at it!"); and a coveted decoration for the Colonel from the Emperor.

A more humorous but scarcely less significant illustration of military domination is the exploit of the renowned Cobbler of Koepenick in 1907. A shoemaker got possession of a captain's uniform, dressed himself in it, marched into the city hall of a Berlin suburb, demanded and was yielded complete possession of the place, helped himself to what pleased him,

and marched out again, to the accompaniment of hearty guffaws from the South German comic journals. The cobbler was later arrested and, I believe, adjudged insane—a fresh instance of the well-known difficulty of drawing the line between the sane and the foolish.

And the monarchy, which omits no opportunity of proclaiming its reliance upon the army, co-operating with, as it always does, or used by, as it always is, all those vested interests whose hope of life lies in the appeal, not to the common sense of men, but to reverence, tradition, authority, and blind force, has maintained since 1870 a systematic cult of king and army, a vast propaganda for the militarist-monarchical idea. In the army, caste rules supreme and is carefully isolated from civilizing influences. Universal service is robbed of much of its democratic significance by a system of classification of recruits partly based upon, partly itself creating, social distinctions in civil life. The officers belong overwhelmingly to a narrow social group and are systematically kept in the spirit of caste. It is of more than passing significance that the Emperor, who has helped to decrease drinking, has been unwilling to discourage in the least degree and has even positively countenanced the caste-enforced system of dueling still maintained in the German army.

To all this the Prussian popular mind is carefully molded by the public-school system, whose organization serves in considerable degree to widen rather than to obliterate class distinctions, and in which the Prussian nationalist cult is methodically inculcated. There is an interesting Royal Decree of February 13, 1890:

German history, and especially that of modern and recent times, must be emphasized, and ancient and mediaeval history must chiefly be taught for the purpose of making the pupils susceptible to the heroic and to historic greatness by the use of examples out of these times.

This was followed by the following more explicit order of the Prussian Minister of Education:

That which was said at the time of Frederick the Great, that “the other nations envy Prussia her King,” is still true today. A wealth of vivid reflections and profoundly suggestive incidents will be furnished by a recital of the uninterrupted work for their country and people in which the Hohenzollerns have been engaged for nearly half a millennium. Hence all the Prussian kings should occupy a prominent place in your teaching.

The elementary schools, the upper schools, the universities, and even the stage have been the agencies of the Prussian state system. Speech, press, and public meeting have been carefully controlled. The

right of association has been rigidly limited. The government with all its resources of social, economic, and intellectual pressure has entered actively into political contests to support the forces of reaction and suppress the promptings of change. Never has there been an attempt on such a scale, so competently engineered or so nearly successful, to distort a people's mind by the pressure of authority. At the time of the Zabern affair there happened to be at the University of Chicago an exchange professor of theology from a Prussian university, to whom I mentioned the incident casually, expecting the sort of reaction one would, I think, naturally expect from a man of his sort in Great Britain or America. Not so! We could not in this country understand, so his reply ran, how necessary it was at all costs to maintain the prestige of the military, and in that strain he continued with some vehemence. We may thank heaven that we cannot understand; but we cannot at the same time help asking ourselves what power it is that produces truculent professors of theology, and sets them to preaching at home and abroad their truculent theology and philosophy. There is but one answer: the Prussian militarist autocracy—and as time goes on we shall realize more and more clearly that the blackest crime of that autocracy is the poisoning of the wells of the generous German spirit.

But you may be asking yourselves, Why is all this our business? Why can we not leave the democrats of Germany to settle this business for themselves? Why can we not leave the Prussian autocracy to run its inevitable course to ruin? For surely none of us believes that such an enterprise can possibly in the long run succeed; the seeds of disaster are planted deep within it, and their roots were visibly spreading before this war began. The answer is, on the one hand, simply the commonplace that no nation can nowadays live unto itself alone, that in this day of growing international interests and activities isolation is impossible; and, on the other hand, that Germany under such management cannot possibly be a tolerable neighbor. The same small group that is dominating Germany's domestic affairs is managing also German world-politics. The same men who clashed the saber in the streets of Zabern are the men who, in the name of Germany, have been swashbuckling through the streets of Europe, sending the gospel of the Hun to Asia, and spreading intrigue and the threat of war from America to India. The same blind pride of caste that they display at home, the same ruthless pursuit of power, the same contempt for the intrinsic value of humanity, are reflected in their disregard of smaller nations, of different cultures, and of international right.

They have attempted to erect Germans into the high caste of humanity. The naïveté with which they express that view is explicable only on the basis of the spirit which informs their daily doings with their own people. Let me quote at random only three or four typical expressions of this curious national egotism. One is from the Kaiser. "Great ideals," he said at the formal opening of the Sieges Allee in 1901, "have become for us Germans a permanent possession, while other nations have lost them. The German nation is now the only people left which is called upon to protect, cultivate, and promote these grand ideals." Professor Lasson, writing to a correspondent in Holland in September, 1914, said: "Germany is the most perfect political structure known to history. We are morally and intellectually superior to all—without a peer. It is the same with our organization and institutions." Professor Delbrueck, in the same book which I quoted a moment ago, writes: "The Germanic constitution, adapted as it is to the exigencies both of peace and war, wants no amendment; for it represents the loftiest of the many forms of political organization now existing in the world." And finally the Prussianized Scotchman, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, in his *Kriegsaufsätze* of 1915, rises to this lyric conclusion: "A liberty which is not German is not a liberty."

This is the spirit which we are called upon to meet. In a war certainly not of our seeking we have been forced to the reluctant realization of a duty we cannot avoid if we are to be permitted to hope for a peace of the world based, not upon domination, but upon mutual tolerance and the appeal to reason; not upon autocracy, but upon democracy. That duty appears now to be simply this: to see to it with every power we possess that the Prussian militarist autocracy comes out of this war unmistakably beaten at its own game; that its boast of unbroken national advancement by the appeal to arms be clearly shattered; and that it be sent back discredited in its only claim to support to be dealt with by the liberty-loving German people over whom for two generations it has so strangely domineered.

Then, and not until then, will the road be open for the next step toward a juster order of the world, toward that league of honor and of peace based upon the method of democracy that President Wilson so admirably pledged us to in his address to the Senate on January 22, and his war address of April 3. How long the first step may be we cannot now tell, but surely it is not only our right but our duty both to dream our dreams and see our visions and to study shrewdly the limits of the practical. Nor should we be so blind as not to see that one of the most

practical of facts is the capacity of human nature in any possible social significance of that term for growth and change, all wiseacres to the contrary notwithstanding; and that one undeniable direction of change in the last half-century has been the transformation of vague hopes of a world-order based, not upon the old, impossible balance of selfish national egotisms, but upon democracy and the appeal to reason into fairly definite programs. New things are possible, and it is the privilege of the New World to insist now upon their possibility.

And finally, let us not in the meantime forget that in entering this war and offering to co-operate in plans for peace in a world made safe for democracy, we are again solemnly dedicating ourselves to the democratic principle of progress. At home we set our faces anew against irrational power and prescriptive authority, against any system whereby the wills of the many are subjected to the uses of the few, and address ourselves again to the business of furthering the "depth and width of human intercourse" among us. And abroad we commit ourselves to the principle of enlightened internationalism, and renounce that old false competitive nationalism which is not an instrument but an obstacle to the main current of progress—to the "fruitful processes of co-operation in the great experiment of living together."

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